List of every trade agreement that marc carney has made since being pm of canada
Executive summary
Mark Carney became Canada’s prime minister in March 2025 and since then his government has pursued multiple trade moves: pausing and recalibrating talks with the United States while removing many retaliatory tariffs (Canada matched U.S. tariff exemptions) and pursuing new agreements or negotiation mandates with partners including the UAE, Singapore, India and ASEAN, plus sectoral measures such as steel import curbs and new tariffs to protect domestic industry [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]. Available sources do not provide a single, comprehensive “list of every trade agreement” Carney has signed; reporting details a mix of announced negotiation starts, memoranda, framework commitments and domestic measures rather than a single catalogue [3] [4] [5] [1].
1. What counts as a “trade agreement”? — definitions matter
Journalists and officials use different terms — memorandum of understanding, negotiation mandate, comprehensive economic partnership, tariff changes, or a finalized free trade agreement — and available reporting shows Carney’s team has announced negotiation starts (India, UAE, ASEAN/Canada‑ASEAN work), MOUs (AI/technology with UAE contacts), and domestic tariff moves rather than a long list of completed, ratified free trade agreements [3] [4] [6] [5]. Sources therefore treat “agreements” loosely; the government press releases frame many items as “secured new agreements” or “commitments to deepen engagement” rather than fully executed trade treaties [3] [4].
2. The United States: tactical retreat, tariff matching and conditional talks
Carney has publicly said talks with President Trump will resume “when it’s appropriate” and has moved to match U.S. tariff exemptions under the USMCA (CUSMA), removing many retaliatory Canadian tariffs as a goodwill step while also warning Canada will not grant unfair access if a U.S. deal fails [7] [1] [8]. At the same time Ottawa has introduced protective measures — notably curbs on steel imports and sectoral support measures — reflecting a dual strategy of seeking negotiated fixes while protecting domestic industries [5] [2] [8].
3. Diversification drive: UAE, Singapore, ASEAN, India and beyond
Carney has foregrounded an explicit strategy to reduce dependence on the U.S. by doubling non‑U.S. exports. He concluded a high‑profile visit to the UAE where his office said he “secured new agreements to attract massive pools of foreign capital” and touted the prospect of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership that could double bilateral trade [3] [9]. In Singapore he discussed progress toward a Canada‑ASEAN free trade agreement aimed to be finalised in 2026 [4]. Reporting also notes Canada and India are restarting trade talks with an aspirational target to double bilateral trade to $50 billion by 2030 [6] [10].
4. China and sectoral skirmishes: negotiations mixed with retaliations
Carney’s government is negotiating with China even as both sides have imposed duties that affect key commodities — for example, Chinese import duties on Canadian canola in response to earlier Canadian tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles — showing a give‑and‑take of sectoral barriers and talks rather than clean new treaties [11]. The public record shows active negotiation and dispute management rather than single sweeping pacts [11].
5. Domestic policy as trade policy: tariffs, quotas and investment pitches
Many of the “agreements” Carney touts are actually domestic trade measures or investment attraction deals: curbs on steel imports, a new steel tariff and freight support for steel and lumber, and large investment promotion efforts with sovereign funds in the UAE — actions designed to reshape trade exposures and attract foreign capital rather than formal multilateral trade treaties [5] [3].
6. What reporting does and doesn’t show — limitations and next steps
Available sources document negotiation starts, press‑release level “agreements,” tariff adjustments and sectoral measures but do not produce a single verified list of every final, ratified trade agreement Carney has signed since March 2025 — many items remain described as “close to striking” or “progress toward” rather than concluded treaties [3] [9] [4]. To compile a verifiable list one would need line‑by‑line confirmation from the Prime Minister’s Office of each signed, ratified instrument and its legal form; that level of detail is not present in the cited reporting [3] [4] [5].
7. Competing perspectives and political framing
Supporters present Carney’s actions as pragmatic diversification and investment attraction that will reduce vulnerability to U.S. tariffs [3] [12]. Critics say the moves are insufficient or symbolic — suggesting some of the touted deals would replace only tiny fractions of U.S. trade and that tariff concessions to the U.S. looked like capitulation [9] [13]. Both narratives appear in the sources and reflect different readings of the same announcements [3] [9] [13].
If you want, I can try to build a candidate list of named initiatives mentioned in reporting (e.g., Canada‑UAE talks/CEP, Canada‑ASEAN work, India trade talks, tariff changes, steel import curbs) with the specific source lines and dates so you can track which are formal treaties versus negotiation or policy actions [3] [4] [6] [5] [1].