What US incentives or policy shifts did the Trump administration use to secure the Abraham Accords?
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Executive summary
The Trump administration secured the original Abraham Accords in 2020 by marrying diplomatic outreach to concrete U.S. policy shifts: it brokered normalization deals between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco and—critically—gave Morocco U.S. recognition of sovereignty over Western Sahara to clinch Rabat’s deal [1] [2]. Analysts and sources say the accords were driven by “geoeconomic” incentives and security alignments against Iran rather than settlement of the Palestinian question [2] [3].
1. How Washington traded policy for normalization
The Trump team used explicit U.S. policy actions as bargaining chips. The clearest documented example is U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, a policy reversal that Cleveland the way for Morocco to normalize with Israel [1] [2]. Commentators and think tanks describe the Accords as built on geoeconomic and security incentives offered or facilitated by the United States, rather than on concessions addressing the Israeli–Palestinian core dispute [2] [3].
2. Economic carrots and “peace through prosperity”
Trump’s architects framed the deals as economic opportunities: opening markets, trade and investment between Israel and Gulf partners. Supporters highlight rising trade (for example, large bilateral flows between Israel and the UAE cited by pro-Accords analysts), and policy messaging that prioritized business partnerships, technology and development as inducements to normalize [4] [5]. Independent analysts also note the Accords leaned heavily on economic integration as a rationale for bypassing traditional political-track issues [2] [3].
3. Security alignments and the Iran factor
Security concerns were central. U.S. diplomacy underscored shared regional threats—chiefly Iran—so that security cooperation, intelligence ties and defense relationships became implicit incentives for Arab states to formalize relations with Israel [2] [6]. Analysts argue the Accords created a de facto alignment against Tehran that helped persuade Gulf partners the benefits of normalization outweighed political costs [2] [3].
4. What the U.S. did not (formally) promise—Palestinian concessions
Available sources show the Accords offered little in the way of inducements to change Israeli policy toward the Palestinians; scholars note there were “no incentives” in the agreements compelling Israeli gestures to Palestinians, and the Palestinian issue was largely sidelined [3]. Critics say that trade-offs that won Arab signatories left the Palestinian question marginalized and thus contained an implicit political cost [3].
5. Contesting views: praise, caution and political trade-offs
Supporters present the deals as transformative diplomacy that produced concrete economic ties and new strategic partnerships [5] [4]. Critics argue Trump “gave away major incentives” to entice partners without securing structural guarantees—raising questions about long-term durability and implications for Israel’s security and U.S. leverage [7]. Think tanks and institutes likewise stress both the Accords’ immediate wins and the limits created by sidelining the Palestinian track [2] [3].
6. Expansion, follow‑on tactics and the second Trump term
After 2020, U.S. envoys and later Trump administrations sought to expand the framework—using diplomatic outreach, envoys’ travel and high-level meetings to persuade additional countries like Azerbaijan and, eventually, Kazakhstan to participate [6] [1]. Reporting indicates later U.S. efforts again leaned on diplomatic inducements, though the exact mix of incentives for post-2020 entries varied by case and sometimes included broader strategic offers [6] [1].
7. Limits, backlash and the Gaza context
The Accords’ momentum faced limits when regional events changed public and political calculations. Widespread anger over Israeli military actions in Gaza diminished popular support for further signatories and complicated U.S. incentive strategies; analysts say expansion inside the Gulf became much harder after hostilities [8] [9]. Some critics contend that earlier U.S. concessions (e.g., on Western Sahara or arms diplomacy) may have reduced Washington’s leverage to secure deeper political outcomes later [7] [9].
8. Bottom line — incentives were transactional, not comprehensive
In sum, U.S. incentives under Trump blended tangible policy shifts (notably Western Sahara recognition for Morocco), economic and security inducements, and diplomatic brokerage to produce the Accords [1] [2] [5]. Sources agree these were transactional arrangements emphasizing geoeconomics and shared security concerns rather than a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict [2] [3]. Limitations: available sources do not mention every behind‑the‑scenes offer or classified commitments that may have accompanied negotiations; reporting focuses on the most visible policy shifts and public diplomatic maneuvers [1] [2].