How did exit poll education gaps between Trump and Clinton change from 2016 to 2024?
Executive summary
Exit-poll and validated-voter data show the education gap widened from 2016 to 2024: Trump’s advantage among voters without a college degree grew from about a 7–9 point edge in 2016 (and much larger among white non‑college voters) to roughly a double‑digit advantage in 2024 — PAC estimates a 13‑point margin among non‑college voters and Pew/Brookings/Edison data show large Republican margins among less‑educated and rural voters (Trump won large margins among voters with less formal education and 69% of rural voters) [1] [2] [3]. At the same time, college‑educated voters shifted further toward Democrats — Clinton won college graduates by about 10 points in 2016 while the 2024 Democratic ticket led college graduates by larger margins, especially at the postgraduate level [1] [2].
1. Education became a stronger predictor of vote choice
Exit polling and post‑election analyses document that educational attainment grew into a clearer cleaving line for presidential preferences between 2016 and 2024. In 2016, Clinton carried college graduates while Trump carried non‑college voters; by 2024 Trump “won by large margins among those with less formal education” while voters with postgraduate degrees favored the Democrat by roughly two‑to‑one [2]. PAC’s 2025 summary frames this as an enlarged “education gap,” noting Trump increased his margin among non‑college graduates from 7 points in 2016 to 13 points in 2024 [1].
2. The non‑college Republican shift was especially strong and consequential
Multiple sources emphasize that the Republican gains were concentrated among voters with less formal education and in rural communities. Pew’s validated‑voter work showed in 2016 Trump’s advantage among white voters without college was extremely large (e.g., Trump won white non‑college voters by roughly two‑to‑one in validated figures) [3]. In 2024, Pew reports Trump captured 69% of rural validated voters and continued to win “large margins among those with less formal education,” giving Republicans a durable base among non‑college voters [2].
3. College‑educated and post‑graduate voters moved toward Democrats
The counterpoint to GOP strength with non‑college voters is Democratic consolidation among the better‑educated. PAC reports Clinton won college graduates by about 10 points in 2016 while the 2024 Democratic ticket (Harris) carried college graduates by a larger margin; Pew shows voters with postgraduate degrees favored Harris by about 65% to 33% in 2024 [1] [2]. That pattern — Democrats stronger among the highly educated — persisted and in some measures intensified between the two cycles [2].
4. Methodology and exit‑poll adjustments matter — interpret gaps cautiously
Observers warn that changes in exit‑poll methodology after 2016 complicate direct comparisons. PAC notes 2016 exit polls overstated Clinton’s support and that polling organizations adjusted procedures afterwards; that history means some of the apparent change between 2016 and 2024 reflects both true voter shifts and refinements in measurement [1]. Pew’s use of validated‑voter analyses for 2016 and detailed subgroup tables for 2024 are helpful but not perfectly symmetrical across years [3] [2].
5. Racial, regional and subgroup dynamics interact with education
Education does not operate in isolation: race, region and religious identity shape the education gap’s electoral effect. Pew and Brookings highlight that the education split was especially sharp among white voters and white evangelicals, where non‑college whites swung heavily to Trump in 2016 and remained a GOP anchor in 2024 [3] [4]. Pew’s 2024 tables show variation by race — for example, educational differences among Hispanic and Black voters were less uniform than among whites [2].
6. Political implications and competing interpretations
One interpretation — advanced by PAC and Pew reporting — is that Republican gains among a growing cohort of non‑college voters helped Trump’s 2024 outcome and that Democrats’ strength among the highly educated creates a durable urban/suburban‑versus‑rural map [1] [2]. An alternative view implicit in the sources is caution: some of the electoral arithmetic depends on turnout composition and polling adjustments; PAC notes the share of non‑college voters in the electorate changed (57% non‑college vs. 43% college in PAC’s account), but also warns that part of that shift could reflect exit‑poll measurement changes made after 2016 [1].
Limitations: available sources document the broad direction and give numeric estimates (e.g., PAC’s 7→13 point change, Pew’s postgraduate margins and rural percentages) but do not provide a single uniform set of exit‑poll tables that map every subgroup identically across 2016 and 2024; direct one‑to‑one comparisons require care because of methodological changes and differing sample frames [1] [2] [3].