Fact check: Did President Trump consider using the Insurrection Act during the 2020 protests?

1. The Core Claim: A Presidential Plan Drafted and Paused

Contemporary investigative reporting revealed that White House advisers and Justice Department lawyers in June 2020 prepared language for an Insurrection Act proclamation and related orders, indicating that invocation moved beyond casual remark to concrete planning. The New York Times reported that a proclamation was drafted and that senior officials, including Attorney General Bill Barr and Defense Secretary Mark Esper, pushed back and helped dissuade President Trump from signing it, signaling internal resistance within the administration to deploying active-duty military under the statute. This reporting documents that the idea reached the level of formal drafting and review, not merely rhetorical threats. ^[1]

2. Oversight Findings: DOJ Inspector General Corroborates Near-Invocation

A Department of Justice Inspector General review provided a later, independent account confirming that DOJ personnel and other administration lawyers laid groundwork for invoking the Insurrection Act, drafting both a proclamation and ancillary orders in June 2020, but ultimately concluding the situation did not meet the criteria for invocation in Washington, D.C. The IG report supplies procedural detail about who prepared documents and why senior leaders decided against moving forward, offering documentary corroboration that the administration came close enough to constitute a genuine consideration of the law’s use. ^[2]

3. Public Statements and Threats: Trump’s Repeated References to the Act

Public remarks by President Trump during the summer of 2020 repeatedly referenced his belief that the Insurrection Act empowered him to deploy military forces to American cities, and he publicly threatened action when state or local authorities did not act to quell unrest. Post-2020 coverage and later explainers on the act document these statements and place them in context, showing a pattern of threats that elevated the risk that an invocation could become policy. Those public threats, taken alongside the internal drafting, underscore that discussion of the act was both public-facing rhetoric and internal operational planning. ^{[3] [4]}

4. Legal and Historical Context: How Invocation Would Differ from National Guard Use

The Insurrection Act of 1807 authorizes the president to call forth the militia or use federal troops to suppress insurrections or enforce federal law, a step that historically has been rare and politically fraught. The statute’s invocation is distinct from National Guard deployments under state governors or the federalized Guard; using the act would have placed active-duty military into domestic law enforcement roles, raising constitutional and civil-military concerns. Past usage—including the 1992 Los Angeles mobilization and earlier 19th-century instances—illustrates why senior civilian and military leaders viewed invocation as a high-risk, escalatory option rather than a routine tool. ^[4]

5. Competing Views Inside and Outside the Administration: Who Pushed, Who Pulled Back

Accounts portray a split among officials: some in the president’s circle and certain advisors urged more forceful federal action, while the attorney general, defense leadership, and military chiefs counseled restraint. These internal dynamics matter because they explain why drafting occurred even as the final decision was to stand down. Outside observers — legal scholars, civil liberties groups, and some lawmakers — warned that invocation would broaden the military’s domestic role and could violate legal limits; supporters framed it as a necessary measure to restore order. The record shows a clear tension between enforcement urgency and constitutional caution. ^{[1] [2]}

6. Bottom Line: Considered Seriously, But Not Used — What That Means

Multiple, independent sources agree that President Trump and his advisers seriously considered invoking the Insurrection Act in June 2020, authoring draft documents and publicly threatening action, but senior officials ultimately dissuaded the president and the act was never invoked. The practical implication is that the administration reached a planning stage sufficient to justify oversight and documentation, making “considered” an accurate description, while the absence of execution spared the country the legal and political consequences that invocation would have carried. The record therefore demonstrates consideration without implementation. ^{[1] [2] [3]}