What foreign policy actions defined Trump's second term and how did allies and adversaries respond?
Executive summary
Donald Trump’s second term has been defined by a 2025 National Security Strategy that narrows U.S. aims to “core national interests,” presses aggressive tariff and immigration measures, and pushes allies to assume far more defense burden — including a NATO pledge to reach 5% of GDP on defense by 2035 — while signaling a tougher, more interventionist posture in the Western Hemisphere and new tools against cartels designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) [1] [2] [3]. Allies in Europe and elsewhere have reacted with alarm and recalibration — from criticism of the NSS’s language about “civilizational erasure” in Europe to a practical pivot by Europeans to shoulder more of the Ukraine burden as U.S. support wanes [4] [5].
1. A compact, transactional strategy: “America First” repackaged
The administration’s 33‑page 2025 National Security Strategy recasts U.S. foreign policy as protection of “core national interests,” explicitly abandons the post‑Cold War liberal order framing, and elevates burden‑sharing (or burden‑shifting) as a central principle — telling allies the U.S. will no longer be “Atlas” for global security [1] [6]. Lawfare and War on the Rocks describe the document as narrowing America’s purpose and institutionalizing an inward‑leaning, transactional orientation that prioritizes migration control, economic security, and a smaller set of global commitments [1] [6].
2. Tariffs and economic national security: sweeping, disruptive protectionism
Trump’s second term reintroduced high, economy‑wide tariffs and withdrew from parts of multilateral tax frameworks, arguing tariffs will rebuild industry and fund domestic priorities; applied U.S. tariff rates reportedly rose sharply in early 2025, and the administration pulled out of Pillar Two of the OECD tax deal [3]. Critics warn the approach revives 20th‑century protectionism and risks retaliation; supporters frame it as enforcing reciprocity and protecting critical industries [3].
3. NATO and Europe: pressure, pledges and political estrangement
The administration forced a new NATO bargain: an ambitious pledge for members to reach 5% of GDP on defense by 2035 — a policy win described by the Atlantic Council and echoed in administration messaging — while the NSS’s rhetoric about “civilizational erasure” and skepticism toward EU institutions provoked European leaders’ consternation [2] [4]. Observers say Europe is simultaneously alarmed by the tone and practical impotence in U.S. support for Ukraine, prompting the EU and member states to assume greater responsibility for sanctions, frozen assets, and military aid [5] [4].
4. Ukraine and Russia: diplomatic outreach, de‑escalation talk, and allied anxiety
Reporting shows U.S. support for Ukraine “ground to a halt” under the administration even as U.S. envoys engaged Russia in talks (including meetings in Riyadh), signaling appetite for negotiated settlements that alarm pro‑Ukraine voices and European partners who fear concessions to Moscow [5] [7]. The Economist and Foreign Policy emphasize strategic incoherence and the possibility that Europe, not the U.S., now holds the decisive levers on the conflict [8] [5].
5. The Western Hemisphere: a new Monroe/“Trump Corollary” and cartel militarization
The NSS and subsequent policy moves assert a revived Monroe Doctrine — the “Trump Corollary” — prioritizing hemispheric control of critical assets and treating migration and transnational crime as central security threats [9] [1]. The administration designated major drug gangs as FTOs and signaled authorization for “targeted deployments” and lethal force, steps that experts say expand legal tools for possible military action in Latin America and risk entangling the U.S. in low‑intensity conflicts [7] [10].
6. Taiwan and China: deterrence without entangling guarantees
The NSS emphasizes deterring conflict over Taiwan through military readiness and partnerships while reiterating opposition to a unilateral Chinese takeover; the administration frames this as deterrence rather than an open‑ended commitment, a posture noted in DefenseScoop and Axios coverage [11] [12]. Analysts point out the tension between “America First” restraint and the need to secure supply chains and critical minerals — often located abroad — creating practical contradictions [12] [11].
7. Domestic politics and implementation risks
Commentators warn that centralizing foreign policy around a highly personal presidency, purges of career officials, and “burden‑shifting” raise execution risks: Congress has been deferential in some respects, but changes to civil‑military relations and the politicization of the state are flagged as potential causes of instability in policy delivery [13] [14]. Foreign‑policy experts disagree on whether the NSS represents coherent strategy or impulsive governance; some insiders call it a strategic refocusing, others a dangerous repudiation of longstanding alliances [6] [8].
Limitations and missing details: available sources do not provide a complete timeline of every second‑term action or exhaustive reactions from every ally and adversary; specific outcomes of the FTO designations, tariff litigation, or NATO spending implementation remain underreported in the provided material (not found in current reporting).