How would a two-state solution define the borders between Israel and a future Palestinian state?
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Executive summary
A two‑state solution as commonly discussed would place the core of a Palestinian state on territory Israel occupied in the 1967 war — the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip — with final borders to be negotiated and often envisaged by reference to the pre‑1967 lines plus agreed land swaps [1] [2]. International and historical documents repeatedly say final contours are to be settled by negotiations; recent UK and UN actions have spoken of “provisional borders” covering lands occupied in 1967 while emphasising that final borders remain subject to agreement [2] [3].
1. What “the two‑state solution” typically means on borders
Advocates and most international consensus since the 1980s frame a Palestinian state made up of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank — territories Israel captured in 1967 — with the two states co‑existing side‑by‑side; the expectation in many diplomatic formulations is a baseline using the 1967 lines as the starting point for negotiation [1]. That baseline is not a legal fait accompli but a negotiating reference against which changes such as land swaps are proposed [1].
2. The 1967 lines as the reference point — why they matter
The 1967 armistice (pre‑June 1967) lines are repeatedly cited as the default map for a two‑state deal because they represent the last internationally recognised armistice boundaries before Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza; the international community (apart from a few states) has generally treated those occupied areas as the territory from which a Palestinian state should be formed [1] [4]. The UK’s 2025 recognition of a Palestinian state with “provisional borders covering lands occupied by Israel in the 1967 conflict” shows how recent diplomacy invokes that reference even while stressing finality requires mutual agreement [2].
3. Land swaps, settlements and the hard work of drawing lines
Multiple diplomatic road maps and proposals historically assume the 1967 lines will be adjusted by mutually agreed land swaps so that major Israeli settlement blocs close to the 1967 boundary could become part of Israel while Palestinians receive equivalent land elsewhere (available sources do not mention specific swap percentages or maps beyond generic reference). The presence and expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank complicate any strict return to the 1967 lines because thousands of settlers now live beyond those lines [1].
4. Jerusalem: the headline dispute that redraws everything
East Jerusalem is repeatedly singled out as contested territory, with its status central to any border deal. The international community has not recognised unilateral Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, and many two‑state frameworks envisage Jerusalem’s final status — or a shared arrangement for holy sites — as a principal element of border negotiations [4] [1]. Recent diplomatic moves and recognitions reference East Jerusalem within the occupied territories that a Palestinian state would encompass pending agreement [2].
5. Gaza’s separation and border practicalities
Gaza and the West Bank are geographically separate and share long borders with Israel; Gaza also borders Egypt. Previous Israeli withdrawals (e.g., 2005 pullout from Gaza) left Israel controlling Gaza’s airspace, coastline and many crossings, which affects how any sovereign border regime would be structured. Reports note Gaza’s de facto border realities differ from legal or negotiated borders [5] [1]. The situation on crossings, such as Rafah between Gaza and Egypt, underlines that borders here are as much operational and security arrangements as lines on a map [6].
6. International consensus, political realities and contested views
There is broad international consensus — with notable exceptions — favouring a negotiated two‑state outcome using 1967 as a reference, but political initiatives, unilateral acts and differing recognitions (for instance by several western states recognising Palestinian statehood in 2025) show divergence in tactics and timing; the Commons Library and UN records reflect both endorsement of provisional borders and stress that final borders require bilateral agreement [2] [3]. Domestic politics inside Israel and among Palestinians, plus violence on the ground, repeatedly make negotiation and implementation elusive [1] [7].
7. What reporting does not say (limits of available sources)
Available sources in this set do not provide a single, authoritative map of final borders, nor do they supply the precise terms of land‑swap formulas, percentages, or step‑by‑step frameworks for adjudicating Jerusalem’s borders; they make clear those details are intended to be the product of negotiation [2] [1]. They also do not record a universally accepted, final treaty text implementing a two‑state border as of the cited reporting [3].
8. Bottom line — legal baseline, political negotiation
The practical definition of borders in any two‑state solution is therefore twofold: legally and diplomatically the 1967 lines are the baseline most often cited by the international community, and politically the actual border would be whatever Israel and the future Palestinian leadership agree — likely including land swaps and special arrangements for Jerusalem and crossings — but those precise contours remain to be negotiated [1] [2].