What concrete incentives did the UAE and Bahrain receive in exchange for normalizing with Israel under the Abraham Accords?
Executive summary
The UAE and Bahrain received a mix of concrete diplomatic, security and economic incentives in return for formal normalization with Israel under the Abraham Accords: U.S. political backing (including high-profile White House ceremonies and continued U.S. support), tangible security cooperation and access to Israeli intelligence and defense ties, rapid economic openings and trade deals, and targeted projects and funds intended to catalyze investment; some promised U.S. arms concessions—most notably the pathway to advanced platforms such as the F‑35—were explicitly tied to the bargain [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. Diplomatic recognition and enhanced ties with the United States
Normalization brought immediate and visible U.S. endorsement: the accords were negotiated and announced from the White House, producing bipartisan Congressional resolutions and ongoing U.S. political support that strengthened Abu Dhabi and Manama’s ties to Washington—an important strategic hedge for Gulf rulers who prize close U.S. relations [1] [5] [2].
2. Security cooperation, intelligence sharing and a counter‑Iran axis
One of the clearest incentives was enhanced security cooperation: the accords created channels for intelligence, early‑warning and defense coordination between Israel and Gulf states, effectively moving Israeli military and surveillance reach closer to the Persian Gulf and aligning shared threat perceptions of Iran—advantages the UAE explicitly sought as part of its strategic calculus [6] [7] [8].
3. U.S. arms and defense assurances (the F‑35 example)
A concrete inducement cited by multiple analysts was U.S. willingness to clear advanced defense sales; the Trump administration reportedly offered the UAE access to F‑35 aircraft as an inducement to normalize, and the Biden administration continued to process related sales—this stands out as a discrete, high‑value bargaining chip tied to the deals [2].
4. Immediate economic openings, trade agreements and investment vehicles
Normalization produced fast commercial results: Israel and the UAE moved to a free‑trade relationship, investment linkages and booming tourism between the countries, with bilateral trade rapidly growing in the following years and new vehicles—such as an Abraham Fund proposed to catalyze billions in private investment—promoted to underpin economic integration [3] [4] [9].
5. Practical cooperation, projects and soft‑power returns
Beyond headline defense and trade items, concrete cooperative projects followed: energy‑and‑water deals in the Negev framework (Prosperity Green/Blue), educational exchanges, direct flights and cultural visits that immediately normalized contacts and produced measurable outputs like increased tourism and student exchanges; the UAE also incorporated Holocaust education after high‑level diplomatic engagement, a symbolic but tangible policy shift linked to the new ties [9] [3].
6. What was postponed or exchanged politically — and what remains ambiguous
A politically salient element often noted is that normalization arguably bought Israel pause on annexation plans in 2020—an implicit political concession valuable to Gulf partners—though the precise quid pro quo language differs between public statements and diplomatic accounts [10]. Several potentially concrete incentives commonly discussed in commentary—such as direct U.S. cash transfers or formal security guarantees beyond arms sales—are not documented in the provided sources, and therefore cannot be asserted here (limitations in reporting).
7. Competing narratives, domestic constraints and hidden agendas
The U.S. role carried clear domestic and political agendas: the Trump administration framed the accords as a diplomatic win, which shaped incentives offered and the public presentation of rewards; recipient states balanced external gains against domestic backlash—particularly in Bahrain, where sectarian politics complicated sustained popular support—revealing that some “incentives” were as much about signaling to Washington and Israel as about delivering mass domestic benefits [2] [5] [11].
Conclusion
The record in open reporting shows a package of tangible gains for Abu Dhabi and Manama: enhanced U.S. political support, advanced arms access pathways, security cooperation with Israel, accelerated trade and targeted investment initiatives, and specific cooperative projects—while some claims (for example, long‑term guarantees or undisclosed side payments) fall outside the documented sources and remain unverified in this corpus [2] [3] [7] [4].