KIIS poll shows rising share of Ukrainians believe Europe/US are tired of Ukraine and pressuring concessions to Russia
Executive summary
A series of KIIS polls from late 2024 through 2025 show growing willingness among some Ukrainians to consider territorial concessions to end the war — KIIS reported about 38% open to conceding some territory in January 2025 [1] — even as major KIIS releases around the same period also show strong rejection of formal recognition of occupied regions as Russian and high confidence in victory with Western support [2] [3]. Available sources do not mention a single KIIS figure that explicitly frames this shift as “Europe/US are tired of Ukraine and pressuring concessions”; that narrative appears in third‑party commentary and requires cautious separation from the raw poll numbers (not found in current reporting).
1. What KIIS actually measured: attitudes toward concessions vs. recognition
KIIS polling shows two related but distinct attitudes: one question asked whether Ukrainians would accept giving up some territories to speed peace while preserving independence — about 38% answered yes in a survey reported in January 2025 [1] — while separate KIIS findings from September–October 2025 show large majorities oppose formal recognition of occupied territories as Russian (67% against) and oppose transferring territory currently under Kyiv’s control to Russia (71% against) [2]. Those numbers demonstrate nuance: a non‑trivial minority is open to tradeoffs aimed at ending the war quickly, but majorities still reject outright territorial surrender or legal recognition of occupation [2] [1].
2. Competing interpretations in media and political commentary
Different outlets and commentators interpret the same KIIS outputs in divergent ways. Some pieces emphasize the rise in openness to concessions as evidence of war fatigue and political pressure on Kyiv [4] [1]. Others stress resilience and continued popular support for leaders and victory — for example, KIIS and partner polls show sizeable trust/approval for President Zelensky (around 57% trust; 63% approval in related surveys) and widespread belief Ukrainians can defeat Russia with Western support (76% in a KIIS omnibus) [5] [6] [3]. The record shows both trends exist in parallel: growing public strain but sustained backing for leadership and Western assistance [3] [7].
3. Limits of the “Europe/US are pressuring concessions” claim
Available reporting on KIIS does not provide direct polling evidence that Ukrainians believe European or U.S. governments are actively pressuring Kyiv to cede territory; that specific framing is not present in the cited KIIS summaries (not found in current reporting). Where geopolitical pressure is alleged, it appears mainly in commentary or analyses outside the KIIS questionnaire. Therefore, conflating increased openness to concessions with an external‑pressure narrative oversteps what the published KIIS data explicitly shows [1] [2].
4. Methodological and contextual caveats to bear in mind
KIIS has shifted methodologies since the full‑scale invasion (telephone CATI rather than face‑to‑face), and surveys typically cover only government‑controlled areas with mobile coverage, excluding occupied territories and some refugee populations — limitations KIIS itself notes and that affect representativeness [8]. Low response rates and the wartime environment can bias who is reachable, so any single percentage point change should be read in the context of sampling constraints and question wording [8].
5. Why both trends can be true at once
Public opinion in wartime is complex: fatigue, economic strain and battlefield setbacks can raise openness to compromises, while national identity, rejection of legal recognition of annexation, and continued trust in leaders sustain resistance to outright surrender [1] [2] [5]. KIIS figures show exactly that mix: sizeable minorities contemplating concessions and majorities rejecting formal territorial transfers or recognition — a split that permits multiple political narratives and policy pressures to coexist [2] [1].
6. What journalists and policymakers should watch next
Future KIIS releases and methodological notes will be decisive: compare the exact question wording, sample frames, and timing around diplomatic events to see whether trends reflect transient anxiety or lasting shifts [9] [8]. Also watch complementary polls and international reporting for direct questions about perceptions of Western pressure — those are not documented in the current KIIS reports cited here (not found in current reporting).
Sources cited: KIIS press releases and published poll reporting [9] [10], Kyiv Independent and LIGA summaries of KIIS results [1] [3] [5] [7], commentary pieces and translations including Visit Ukraine and Pravda EN [2] [4], and methodological/contextual discussion in DW and Reuters reporting on related KIIS surveys [8] [11].