How have U.S. allies reacted to Trump's 2025 foreign‑policy operations in Latin America and the Caribbean?

1. Regional split: praise from right‑wing allies, condemnation from progressives

The hemisphere cleaved visibly after the Caracas operation: Argentine libertarian Javier Milei and Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa applauded the U.S. move as a liberation or demonstration of strength, while leaders such as Chile’s Gabriel Boric publicly denounced it as a breach of sovereignty and international law ^{[1] [2]}. Reporting shows a clear pattern where emergent center‑right and far‑right governments have been more enthusiastic, while traditional center‑left governments and many civil‑society voices expressed alarm and legal objections ^{[2] [5]}.

2. Concern over legality, norms and the return of “gunboat diplomacy”

Human‑rights and regional governance observers framed the operation as symptomatic of a policy that privileges raw force over multilateral legal frameworks, with commentators and organizations warning of a revived Monroe Doctrine‑style assertiveness—what some call a “Donroe” or “Trump Corollary”—that sidelines democracy promotion and international norms ^{[6] [7]}. WOLA explicitly labeled the Venezuelan operation unlawful and unilateral and linked it to a broader dismantling of U.S. support for democratic institutions in the region ^[8].

3. Allies that benefit or align politically receive U.S. backing, creating patronage dynamics

Multiple accounts note a transactional dynamic: the administration has rewarded loyal regional leaders and pressured those who resist, cultivating a bloc of acquiescent partners while punishing critics — a feature of the new approach acknowledged by reporting and analysts who track shifting U.S. influence in the region ^{[5] [9]}. This pattern has political payoffs for the administration but risks alienating partners who value predictable, rules‑based cooperation ^[9].

4. Strategic alarm: hedging, rebalancing toward China/Russia and institutional friction

European and Asian allies have expressed dismay at the destabilizing effect of unilateral U.S. operations, warning they could prompt strategic hedging in capitals such as Brasília and encourage deeper ties to Beijing or Moscow as insurance against U.S. unpredictability ^{[3] [4]}. Think tanks and analysts argue that the hard‑edged, hemisphere‑first security doctrine has left many Latin American leaders noting a lack of coherent, long‑term policy from Washington, increasing the incentive to diversify partnerships ^{[7] [10]}.

5. Allies’ practical responses run the gamut from acquiescence to procedural checks

Some partners have quietly cooperated on intelligence, arrests, or burden‑sharing, while legislative and institutional actors in the United States and abroad sought procedural constraints after the operation — for example, U.S. congressional moves to require notification of future hostile actions in Venezuela indicate allied and domestic pressure for guardrails ^{[11] [12]}. CSIS’s assessment underscores that allies will vary: some will lean away from cooperation, others will try to preserve alliance equities despite the disruption ^[13].

6. Competing narratives: U.S. government claims of success vs. polling and critical commentary

The State Department framed the year as a string of security and enforcement wins ― publicizing arrests, cartel designations, and the capture of Venezuelan leaders as diplomatic achievements and a reorientation toward “America First” results ^[12]. That message runs up against public skepticism — a majority of U.S. adults said Trump overstepped on military interventions in an AP‑NORC poll — and critical outlets that warn the approach undermines the liberal international order ^{[14] [3]}.