How has the U.S.-backed Gaza peace plan defined the second phase and its security benchmarks?
Executive summary
The U.S.-backed Gaza peace plan defines phase two as the transition “from ceasefire to demilitarisation, technocratic governance, and reconstruction,” centering on Hamas’s disarmament, phased Israeli withdrawals, deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to assume security responsibilities, and the installment of an interim technocratic Palestinian administration supervised by a U.S.-led “Board of Peace” [1] [2] [3]. The plan’s security benchmarks are framed in legal and institutional language—UN Security Council Resolution 2803 ties Israeli withdrawal milestones to verifiable progress on Hamas disarmament and mandates six-monthly Council reports—but the documents and expert commentary highlight major gaps on how disarmament, force composition, and enforcement will work on the ground [4] [2] [5].
1. What phase two formally contains: demilitarisation, withdrawals, ISF and technocrats
Official summaries and U.S. statements present phase two as four linked pillars: the demilitarisation of Gaza (disarming Hamas and other factions); further withdrawals of Israeli forces to pre-agreed lines; the gradual transfer of security duties to an international stabilization contingent; and the establishment of a temporary technocratic Palestinian governing committee under oversight of a Board of Peace that will supervise reconstruction and governance until Palestinian Authority (PA) reform is complete [2] [3] [1].
2. The specific security benchmarks the plan posits
The plan and the Security Council text set two core, connected benchmarks: (a) demonstrable disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups and (b) verifiable conditions permitting phased Israeli withdrawals tied to that disarmament, with six‑monthly progress reporting to the Security Council to determine next steps [4] [2]. Complementary objectives include a formal DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) process, the training and deployment of Palestinian security units under ISF supervision, and mechanisms to prevent rearmament, all presented as prerequisites for transferring local authority [3] [5] [6].
3. Who enforces those benchmarks — the ISF, Board of Peace and international oversight
Implementation authority is split: a UN‑mandated ISF (endorsed in the Security Council resolution) is to take primary on‑the‑ground security responsibilities while a Board of Peace—headed by the U.S. proposal’s patrons—oversees governance, reconstruction and the NCAG (National Committee for the Administration of Gaza) that will run day‑to‑day affairs during the transition [4] [7]. The plan envisions the ISF supervising Palestinian police as they are trained and the Board determining when PA reforms suffice for a handover [3] [8].
4. Gaps, practical hurdles and disputed definitions of “disarmament”
Reporting and expert analyses underscore that the plan defines benchmarks but lacks operational detail: there is no agreed, public blueprint for how weapons will be collected, stored, degraded or monitored; Hamas has not uniformly agreed to full demilitarisation and signals range from conditional acceptance to outright rejection; and few states have committed troops to the ISF, leaving questions about force composition, mandates and Palestinian acceptance unresolved [5] [9] [10]. Critics argue the Board’s sweep over Gaza governance raises legal and political concerns, while proponents insist the benchmarks provide diplomatic leverage to prevent a return to open conflict [8] [11].
5. The political and operational stakes if benchmarks fail
The plan ties Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction funding to security benchmarks, so failure to credibly demilitarise or to field a legitimate stabilization force risks keeping Israeli forces in place, fracturing Gaza governance, and stalling reconstruction—outcomes flagged by analysts as likely to produce either partitioned governance or renewed violence [6] [5]. Conversely, supporters say a monitored DDR process, international security presence and a technocratic interim authority could create the conditions for PA re‑entry and longer‑term normalization, but that scenario depends on diplomatic sustainment, troop pledges and enforceable verification mechanisms that are not yet public [11] [3].