How might shifting US-China relations and emerging technologies influence the next global order by 2030?
Executive summary
The shape of the global order by 2030 will be driven by a brittle hybrid of hardened U.S.–China strategic competition and persistent economic and technological interdependence, with emerging technologies—especially AI and digital infrastructure—amplifying both rivalry and points of unavoidable cooperation [1] [2]. How Washington and Beijing manage military trajectories, technology supply chains, and diplomatic competition for the Global South will determine whether the decade tilts toward managed coexistence or episodic crises that reshape norms and institutions [3] [4].
1. The paradox of deep interdependence and hardening competition
Economic and technological linkages mean the United States and China will continue to be structurally entangled even as political and security rivalry hardens: trade, investment, and cross-border tech activity persist despite decoupling rhetoric, producing a “hardening competition” that coexists with mutual dependence and constrains both countries’ options [1] [2]. Experts argue this duality makes major, sustained improvements in ties unlikely absent unexpected policy shifts, while also creating incentives to avoid catastrophic breakdowns because each side would suffer economically and technologically if ties collapse [1] [5].
2. Emerging technologies as accelerants of power and points of contention
Artificial intelligence, semiconductor supply chains, and digital infrastructure are central arenas of competition: the U.S. and China together dominate AI-related firms and talent, and stand to capture the bulk of AI-driven economic gains by 2030, making tech policy an immediate foreign-policy tool and battleground [1] [2]. Technology decoupling or bifurcation—dual standards for hardware, algorithms, and internet governance—could institutionalize rival tech ecosystems, forcing other states to choose alignments or navigate costly interoperability regimes [1] [6].
3. Military modernization, nuclear trajectories, and crisis instability
China’s force modernization—including projected large nuclear force growth—raises deterrence and crisis-management challenges in hotspots such as the Taiwan Strait, and could prompt reciprocal military investments that increase the risk of miscalculation absent new crisis-management arrangements [3] [7]. Policy proposals emphasize that arms-control-like scaffolding and communications channels could slow arms competition and add “off-ramps,” echoing Cold War precedents, but such measures require political will that remains uncertain [3] [7].
4. Global governance, the Global South, and competing orders
Both capitals are competing for influence among developing countries and within multilateral fora: Beijing emphasizes alternative visions of global governance and seeks deeper ties with the Global South and BRICS+, while Washington courts partners to blunt perceived Chinese rule-shaping and to defend aspects of the existing rules-based order [6] [4]. Multiple analysts warn that this is not a simple bipolar reprise; many states will navigate between powers, creating a more multipolar and transactional order where alliances are issue-specific rather than blocs [8] [9].
5. Windows for cooperation on global public goods — limited but consequential
Despite rivalry, both sides retain incentives to cooperate on transnational challenges—climate, pandemics, and some science and technology norms—because failures on these fronts would be globally catastrophic and politically costly for both capitals; experts argue targeted cooperation could coexist with competition if carefully scaffolded [10] [5]. Yet the absence of a broadly shared purpose and rising domestic political constraints make sustained, deep cooperation difficult, meaning piecemeal agreements are the more realistic near-term outcome [4] [5].
6. Two plausible 2030 trajectories and what would change them
By 2030 the most likely trajectories are either a “managed coexistence” in which stable, narrowly bounded mechanisms—tech dialogues, crisis hotlines, selective arms restraint—reduce risks while competition remains intense, or a more disruptive path where tech bifurcation and regional crises entrench rival orders and accelerate multipolar fragmentation; the difference hinges on political leadership choices, domestic politics, and willingness to build pragmatic scaffolding for crisis management [3] [11] [4]. Reporting and expert surveys underscore that the world will be significantly more contested and institutionally stressed by 2030; whether that stress produces adaptation and new cooperation, or fragmentation and rivalry, depends on how both powers and their partners prioritize stability versus short-term strategic advantage [9] [11].