Fact check: Can the US still be considered a liberal democracy?

1. What critics are claiming about the U.S. democratic backslide—and why it matters now

Several sources claim the United States is experiencing an erosion of liberal-democratic norms through executive actions that weaken institutional checks, citing the period in September 2025 as particularly illustrative. One column frames President Trump’s conduct as striking at the founding values of equality, individual liberty, and limited government, arguing his administration has taken steps that weaken the foundations of democratic rule ^[1]. A CNN Business report catalogues recent actions—such as the firing of the nation’s top economic statistician and moves that undermine central bank independence—as concrete signs that governance norms are fraying and that the economy and rule of law are at risk ^[3]. These claims emphasize immediate institutional effects rather than abstract theory.

2. How worried international observers want democracies to respond

A policy-oriented analysis argues democracies should not simply hope U.S. domestic politics stabilize but should build parallel institutions—stronger economic and defense ties among like-minded states—to reduce vulnerability to an unpredictable Washington ^[2]. The recommendation frames the risk as strategic: the U.S. might abandon allies or partner with authoritarian regimes, so other democracies should insulate themselves through cooperation. This prescription shifts the focus from domestic remediation to international hedging, treating U.S. democratic erosion as a systemic geopolitical problem requiring coalition-building and institutional redundancy ^[2].

3. Evidence cited: personnel changes and institutional independence under stress

Two pieces converge on concrete events as evidence. The CNN Business piece documents recent high-profile firings—most notably of the nation’s top economic statistician—and actions interpreted as efforts to weaken central bank independence, arguing these moves undermine democratic governance and market confidence ^[3]. The column and commentary likewise highlight presidential conduct and administrative patterns that critics say reduce accountability and expand executive discretion ^{[1] [4]}. These examples function as proximate indicators: critics treat them as symptoms that, in aggregation, point to democratic erosion rather than isolated personnel disputes ^{[1] [3] [4]}.

4. Voices calling the U.S. authoritarian—and the counterarguments embedded in tone

An opinion piece labels the United States an authoritarian state, asserting that checks on presidential power have weakened to the point that the leader can act with impunity ^[4]. This framing is polemical and signals a normative judgment meant to mobilize readers. Other pieces, while critical, adopt policy prescriptions rather than absolute labels: they warn of weakened institutions and recommend remedies without declaring the system wholly lost ^{[1] [2]}. The contrast in tone suggests differing agendas—mobilizing outrage versus offering strategic policy responses—requiring readers to weigh rhetoric against tangible institutional indicators ^{[4] [2]}.

5. Dates and sequencing: why September 2025 is the focal window

All four analyses cluster between September 12 and September 24, 2025, which frames the debate as a reaction to a recent sequence of actions rather than a long-term historical diagnosis ^{[2] [1] [3] [4]}. The tight timeframe amplifies perceptions of acceleration and crisis, making short-term events more salient. That concentration of reporting shapes interpretations: critics treat the month’s events as either the culmination of longer trends or as an inflection point requiring rapid policy responses. The dating matters because it foregrounds contemporaneous political dynamics over structural, longitudinal metrics of democratic health ^{[2] [3]}.

6. Assessing agendas and what’s missing from these accounts

Each source carries an evident agenda: a column frames moral and civic decline, a policy piece prescribes international hedging, a business outlet emphasizes economic implications, and a polemic asserts authoritarian transformation ^{[1] [2] [3] [4]}. What these pieces largely omit are comprehensive empirical measures—longitudinal datasets on civil liberties, judicial independence, and public opinion—that would contextualize whether September 2025 represents a tipping point or an episode within cyclical contestation. The debate would benefit from integrating quantitative indicators alongside the qualitative incidents these sources highlight ^{[3] [1]}.

7. Bottom line: can the U.S. still be called a liberal democracy?

The supplied materials do not deliver a unanimous verdict but collectively indicate serious and contemporaneous challenges to liberal-democratic norms, centering on executive behavior and institutional assaults observed in September 2025. Whether those challenges amount to a terminal collapse into authoritarianism remains contested in these texts: some declare that conclusion outright, while others call for policy responses and international hedge strategies without pronouncing the system irretrievably lost ^{[4] [2] [3] [1]}. Readers should treat urgent examples as signals requiring broader, empirically grounded assessment rather than definitive proof of an irreversible transformation.