Us political violence incidents right wing Islamist
Executive summary
Academic data show that in the United States, right‑wing and Islamist extremists have similar levels of violence in some datasets, while globally Islamist attacks tend to be deadlier; researchers found left‑wing actors are consistently less violent [1] [2] [3]. Recent U.S. reporting and NGO tracking through 2024–2025 highlight a surge in right‑wing fatalities over the past decade but also a marked increase in Islamist‑inspired incidents in 2024–2025 — including a deadly New Orleans vehicular attack on Jan. 1, 2025 — that interrupted prior downward trends [4] [5] [6].
1. What the data say: ideology and violence, side‑by‑side
Comparative academic work using two large datasets concludes that in the United States there is “no difference between the level of violence perpetrated by right‑wing and Islamist extremists,” while both studies consistently find left‑wing associated acts are less likely to be violent [1] [2] [3]. That finding is the headline result of a PNAS/START analysis that directly compared left, right and Islamist actors both domestically and worldwide [2] [3].
2. Global picture: Islamist attacks can be deadlier
The same PNAS study qualifies the U.S. finding by noting that, in the worldwide dataset, Islamist extremists engage in deadlier attacks compared with other ideologies — reflecting the post‑9/11 era rise of groups such as al‑Qaeda and ISIS and their affiliates [2] [3]. In other words: U.S. patterns do not necessarily mirror global lethality profiles documented in the research [2].
3. Recent U.S. incidents changed the short‑term landscape
NGO monitoring and press reporting through 2024–2025 show an uptick in Islamist‑inspired plots and incidents in the U.S., capped by a vehicle attack in New Orleans on Jan. 1, 2025 that ADL describes as the first domestic Islamist mass killing since 2017 and a potential inflection point if it presages more homegrown Islamist violence [4] [5] [6]. ADL’s public statements warn that a multi‑year decline in extremist‑related murders could be interrupted by a rise in Islamist incidents [5].
4. Right‑wing violence: majority of historical domestic fatalities
Multiple reviews and datasets referenced in reporting and encyclopedic summaries show right‑wing actors have caused the bulk of U.S. political‑ideological killings across recent decades; right‑wing incidents and fatalities often outnumber Islamist and left‑wing totals in cumulative counts [7] [8]. NGOs and news outlets continue to track white supremacist and far‑right mass shootings as a persistent domestic threat [7].
5. Short‑term shifts versus long‑term baselines
Think in two timeframes: long‑term datasets show right‑wing perpetrators account for a disproportionate share of domestic fatalities over decades, with Islamist actors also producing significant lethality globally [7] [2]. Short‑term NGO tracking in 2024–2025 documents a rise in Islamist incidents and several high‑profile events that change the annual picture and prompt warnings about an interrupted decline in extremist killings [5] [6] [4].
6. Competing narratives and political use of threats
Public officials and political actors emphasize different threats. For example, recent political statements have framed “radical Islam” as an “imminent threat” internationally — rhetoric that often aligns with policy moves such as visa restrictions — while other analysts point to the enduring domestic toll of right‑wing violence [9] [7]. Sources show both sides are emphasized in public discourse; available sources do not mention whether one side is being systematically exaggerated beyond the cited reporting [9] [7].
7. Limitations, gaps and how to read the numbers
Different datasets use different definitions (plots vs. attacks, domestic vs. transnational, lethality metrics), and authors caution against conflating short‑term spikes with long‑term trends; the PNAS team explicitly notes cross‑dataset differences between U.S. and global patterns [2] [3]. NGO trackers like ADL focus on calendar‑year incidents and may call attention to emergent spikes such as the 2025 New Orleans attack — a development that changes short‑term risk assessments but does not on its own rewrite multi‑decade baselines [5] [4].
8. Bottom line for readers and policymakers
Data show left‑wing political violence is comparatively less violent; over decades right‑wing perpetrators caused more domestic deaths, but Islamist extremist incidents have been especially deadly globally and surged in U.S. incidents in 2024–2025 — a combination that requires both sustained long‑term prevention against far‑right domestic threats and nimble responses to emergent Islamist‑inspired activity [1] [2] [3] [4] [5].