United States right wing left wing political violence
Executive summary
Data through mid‑2025 show a long-term dominance of right‑wing political violence in the United States but also a measurable rise in left‑wing incidents this year: CSIS reports that left‑wing attacks outnumbered far‑right attacks in the first half of 2025 for the first time in more than 30 years [1], even as multiple researchers and news outlets continue to find that right‑wing extremists have caused more fatalities over recent decades [2] [3] [4].
1. The headline: a rare statistical reversal — and why it matters
A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analysis found that, through July 4, 2025, left‑wing terrorist plots and attacks outnumbered far‑right incidents for the first time in over 30 years, driven in part by a small number of incidents in a short time frame [1]. Reporting and experts stress this is newsworthy because it interrupts a long historical pattern — but they also caution that the finding rests on a narrow window of data and on definitions that differ across datasets [5] [6].
2. Long view: right‑wing violence still dominates fatalities and historical totals
Multiple research teams and major outlets point out that, across decades, right‑wing extremists have committed more attacks and far more deadly attacks than left‑wing actors: academic tracking, The Conversation and PBS cite the preponderance of right‑wing violence and its greater lethality [2] [3]. The Justice Department previously hosted a study concluding far‑right actors were responsible for many ideologically motivated homicides — a report that later was removed from the DoJ website, underscoring institutional sensitivity to these datasets [4].
3. Methodology matters: small numbers, definitions and time windows
Experts and reporters repeatedly warn that the apparent 2025 shift emerges from a short time span and small absolute counts — five left‑wing incidents versus one far‑right incident in the CSIS window — and that such spikes can produce outsized impressions when annual totals are tiny [6] [7]. FactCheck, NPR and Just Security emphasize differences in how “terrorist attack,” “plot,” and ideological labels are coded and how fatality counts or targets (e.g., government facilities) change interpretations [6] [1] [8].
4. What the numbers actually show about lethality and scale
Even where left‑wing incidents rose in 2025, analysts note the historical lethality gap remains: long‑term counts show far more deaths from right‑wing attacks than left‑wing ones [5] [2]. For example, CSIS and Axios report that left‑wing extremists carried out 41 attacks since 2016 compared with 152 by the far right over the same interval, and that left‑wing violence has resulted in far fewer deaths over the past decade [5].
5. Politics, rhetoric and the risk of weaponizing data
Public and political actors have used selective readings of these studies to advance policy or political narratives: administration figures and allies have sometimes emphasized left‑wing violence as a primary threat, while critics point to long‑term right‑wing lethality and the DoJ study removal as evidence of politicization [4] [6]. Commentators and think tanks warn both sides can cherry‑pick short windows or disputed categorizations to justify prosecutions, policy changes, or rhetorical attacks [8] [9].
6. Public perception diverges from nuance: Americans feel violence is rising
Surveys show a broad public sense that politically motivated violence has increased — 85% of adults in a September 2025 Pew survey said such violence is rising, with roughly equal shares of Republicans and Democrats expressing concern — even as Americans disagree about which side poses a greater problem [10]. That perception fuels political pressure independent of granular incident counts.
7. Bottom line and journalistic caveats
Available sources show a tangible uptick in documented left‑wing incidents in early 2025 that, over a narrow window, exceeded far‑right incidents [1], but long‑term data and fatality totals continue to place right‑wing extremism as historically more frequent and deadlier [2] [3] [5]. Analysts caution that small absolute numbers, differing definitions, and short timeframes can create misleading narratives; readers should treat the 2025 reversal as a signal worth study, not as definitive proof that the long‑running risk landscape has permanently flipped [6] [7].
Limitations: available sources do not provide comprehensive, reconciled datasets that harmonize definitions and timeframes across all studies; differing methodologies explain many of the conflicting headlines [1] [6].