How did Afghan government and regional actors respond to the US-Taliban deal and its impact on intra-Afghan peace talks?
This fact-check may be outdated. Consider refreshing it to get the most current information.
Executive summary
The US-Taliban Doha agreement of 29 February 2020 promised a US troop drawdown and Taliban counter‑terrorism assurances and called for intra‑Afghan talks — but the Afghan government rejected being bypassed and intra‑Afghan negotiations stalled amid rising violence and mistrust [1] [2] [3]. Regional actors treated the deal as both an opportunity and a threat: Iran and other neighbours feared instability and potential spoilers [4], while Pakistan, Qatar, Turkey and Gulf states later became mediators in follow‑on Pakistan–Afghanistan talks after cross‑border clashes [5] [6].
1. How Kabul reacted: delegitimized, resistant, then sidelined
The Afghan government never signed the US‑Taliban accord and publicly rejected terms that it said sidelined its sovereignty — Afghan President Ashraf Ghani insisted the Taliban must meet Kabul’s conditions before intra‑Afghan talks could proceed [2]. Kabul viewed the deal as creating incentives for the Taliban to step up offensives against government forces while enjoying guarantees from the U.S., a dynamic later blamed for weakening Afghan National Defense and Security Forces [1] [7]. International actors — NATO and Western partners — continued to call for Afghan‑led negotiations and inclusivity even as the government’s leverage eroded [8] [9].
2. The intra‑Afghan talks: promised, delayed, undermined by violence
The Doha accord opened a path to intra‑Afghan talks but the agreement contained no public requirement for the Taliban to stop attacks on Afghan forces; annexes were classified, and violence continued to hinder direct Afghan‑Taliban dialogue [10] [3]. Analysts at Brookings argued the U.S. committed to measurable steps while the Taliban’s obligations were vague, producing conditions in which mass prisoner releases and ongoing violence made productive intra‑Afghan talks unlikely [3] [11]. Available sources do not mention a definitive outcome of the initial intra‑Afghan process beyond these stalemates and setbacks.
3. U.S. policy tradeoffs: withdrawal as leverage, but with costs
U.S. negotiators framed the deal as a structured exit conditional on Taliban counter‑terrorism pledges; critics say the deal traded leverage for a timeline the Taliban could exploit [1] [12]. Brookings experts warned that Washington’s domestic politics and desire to show progress made administrations reluctant to walk away — effectively constraining enforcement of Taliban commitments [3] [11]. U.S. defense officials later assessed that restrictions on strikes and withdrawal commitments strengthened the Taliban’s battlefield position [7].
4. Regional responses: mediation, alarm and the risk of spoilers
Regional powers reacted with mixed strategies: some sought to mediate or capitalise on openings, while others feared the deal would deepen instability. Iran has been studied as a likely “spoiler” that distrusts the Taliban’s anti‑Shia stance and fears cross‑border insecurity [4]. Pakistan, Qatar and Turkey later hosted and mediated ceasefire and border talks between Afghan authorities and Islamabad after violent cross‑border clashes in 2025 — showing how regional actors assumed hands‑on roles once Kabul and Islamabad were directly at odds [5] [13].
5. Pakistan and cross‑border dynamics: from leverage to ceasefire diplomacy
Pakistan repeatedly pressed that Afghanistan curb groups attacking Pakistan; Kabul/Taliban pushed back at demands they said exceeded Afghanistan’s capacity, producing a cycle of accusations, border firefights and mediated ceasefires [14] [15]. In October 2025, Qatar and Turkey brokered an immediate ceasefire and follow‑up talks in Doha and Istanbul — illustrating how the US‑Taliban deal’s fallout expanded into a wider regional security problem requiring multilateral mediation [5] [13].
6. What the evidence shows — and what it doesn’t
Reported evidence is consistent: the Doha agreement accelerated a U.S. drawdown and opened a diplomatic track that failed to produce a durable intra‑Afghan settlement, while emboldening the Taliban and prompting regional responses and mediation efforts [1] [3] [2]. Sources document subsequent regional ceasefires and negotiations [5] [15]. Available sources do not mention any single, sustained intra‑Afghan political settlement that emerged directly from the 2020 agreement; nor do they assert that all regional actors reacted uniformly — instead they show competing agendas and occasional mediation [4] [5].
Limitations and competing views: scholars and policy centers (Brookings, CAM) differ on whether the deal was a necessary step toward ending a long war or a strategic error that exchanged leverage for a timetable [3] [12]. Some data (ACLED) showed the Taliban did stop attacks on coalition forces after the accord, indicating internal control over fighters on that narrow metric even as attacks on Afghan government forces continued [10]. Policymakers cited by NATO and U.S. reviews emphasize the need for Afghan ownership of talks, a principle repeatedly urged but often unrealised in practice [8] [9].