Violence on the right versus violence on the left
Executive summary
Recent empirical work shows right‑wing political violence has produced the bulk of fatalities in the United States in recent years, while left‑wing attacks have risen from low baselines and remain less lethal on average; at the same time, multiple datasets and scholars warn that definitions, sampling, and short‑term spikes can change impressions and policy choices [1] [2] [3].
1. What the headline counts say: fatalities and frequency
Multiple contemporary analyses converge on a simple headline: most domestic‑terrorism fatalities in recent U.S. reporting have been caused by right‑wing actors, with independent summaries putting right‑wing attacks at roughly three‑quarters of recent domestic‑terrorism deaths [1], and long‑run tallies showing far‑right killings outnumber far‑left deaths (for example, 112 versus 13 over the past decade in one dataset) [4].
2. The nuance beneath the numbers: lethality, definitions and datasets
Researchers stress that “who killed more people” depends on how incidents are defined and counted: some studies find left‑wing incidents are far more likely to be non‑lethal and overall less violent, while other cross‑dataset comparisons show little difference between right‑wing and Islamist violence and identify left‑wing actors as substantially less likely to use violence [2] [5] [6] [7].
3. Short‑term spikes versus long‑run trends
A flurry of left‑wing attacks in early‑to‑mid 2025 produced headlines noting that left‑wing incidents briefly outpaced right‑wing incidents in that window, which analysts describe as a spike rising from very low levels rather than a wholesale reversal of long‑term patterns [8] [4]. Scholarly and policy observers caution that temporary surges can distort perceptions if not placed in the context of longer time series that still show higher volumes and lethality from far‑right actors [9].
4. Methodological disagreements and political leverage
Differences in conclusions often trace to methodology: which datasets are used (government versus academic), how “terrorism” is operationalized, and whether lone actors, plots, or completed attacks are counted; critics argue some recent reports risk feeding political narratives that over‑emphasize one side, and several commentators have noted political actors quickly weaponize findings to press law‑enforcement or policy priorities [10] [9] [8].
5. Recruitment, tactics and operational similarities
Government‑level reviews and criminal‑justice analyses emphasize that violent extremists on both left and right share recruitment reservoirs (including veterans and prison populations), and commit overlapping crimes—bombings, attacks on officials and installations—so both ideologies pose risks that deserve monitoring even if their scale and lethality differ [11].
6. Public perception, polarization and policy consequences
Public opinion is divided and partisan: polls show Americans are roughly split on whether left‑ or right‑wing violence is the bigger problem and that partisans tend to see the other side as the greater threat (YouGov and Pew data reflect this polarization) [12] [13]. That perception gap raises the risk that counter‑extremism resources and rhetorical attention will track partisan salience rather than comparative risk as measured by multiple datasets [10].
7. Bottom line and what the evidence supports
The preponderance of evidence across academic and independent reviews supports two linked conclusions: historically and in recent multi‑year counts, right‑wing extremists have inflicted more lethal violence than left‑wing extremists, yet left‑wing incidents have risen from low baselines and can produce dangerous spikes that merit attention; policy should therefore be proportional to measured harm while remaining responsive to changing trends and transparent about definitional limits [1] [2] [4] [3].