Fact check: How do voting machine manufacturers address tampering concerns in the 2024 election?

1. What manufacturers claim they changed to stop tampering from happening

Manufacturers like Clear Ballot publicly asserted that their systems are not connected to the internet, rely on paper ballots for voter intent records, include redundant local data storage, and use controlled on-site setup with unique passwords to reduce remote or mass compromise risk ^{[1] [2]}. These claims stress that a successful attack would require combining technical exploitation with physical access and chain-of-custody breaches, raising the bar beyond a single-scenario hack. Vendors framed these measures as practical defenses that convert most cyber-threat scenarios into detectable, auditable events via paper audits and recounts ^{[1] [2]}.

2. How federal and voluntary certification reinforced manufacturer assertions

The Voting System Testing and Certification Program requires manufacturers to subject devices to standardized testing against Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, which includes functional, security, and procedural review steps intended to catch exploitable weaknesses before deployment ^[3]. Certification processes create a documented baseline for devices, and vendors used certification status to argue systems met recognized security standards. State and federal certification does not eliminate all risk but creates an external verification loop—a crucial factor manufacturers cite when responding to tampering concerns and when election officials select equipment ^[3].

3. What election officials do day-to-day to detect tampering

Election jurisdictions perform logic and accuracy testing, pre-election sealing and securing of devices, post-election audits, and chain-of-custody protocols to detect or deter tampering, with officials in Pennsylvania and elsewhere running sample ballots to validate tabulator counts before ballots are opened to the public ^[6]. These operational controls are the human and procedural complement to vendor security features; officials emphasize that procedural rigor matters as much as device design, because improper handling or lax testing undermines technological safeguards ^[6].

4. The centrality of paper ballots and manual audits to public confidence

Experts highlighted that about 98% of ballots are paper-based, and paper records allow hand recounts and risk-limiting audits that can correct or reveal machine errors and fraud, forming the backbone of most manufacturers’ and officials’ arguments that tampering is both difficult and detectable ^{[4] [1]}. Vendors and many election officials leaned on paper trails as the ultimate mitigation: even if a scanner were compromised, the physical ballot remains the authoritative record, enabling correction through manual examination and mitigating the impact of device-level manipulations ^{[4] [1]}.

5. The role of misinformation and high-profile claims in reframing risk

High-profile assertions that machines are easily hacked—such as public figures suggesting straightforward exploitation—were widely disputed by election officials and experts who argued devices are too simple or physically protected to be mass-hacked and that misinformation amplifies perceived risk beyond technical reality ^{[5] [1]}. Manufacturers and officials warned that false narratives can undermine confidence and lead to inappropriate policy responses, while also acknowledging that public skepticism has driven investments in clear paper trails and more transparent testing ^{[5] [1]}.

6. State and international upgrades show different emphasis and timelines

Some jurisdictions upgraded hardware in response to capacity and security concerns—Connecticut introduced new high-speed tabulators intended to replace outdated machines and boost efficiency, while the Philippines moved to centralize certification under its Department of Science and Technology to shore up confidence in vote-counting machines ^{[7] [8]}. These examples show diverse policy responses: U.S. states prioritized paper-based audits and certification rigor, while other nations focused on institutional certification changes and equipment modernization to address both integrity and efficiency ^{[7] [8]}.

7. Remaining vulnerabilities and realistic attack scenarios vendors acknowledge

Manufacturers concede that no system is absolutely invulnerable: successful tampering would likely require physical access, multiple procedural failures, and collusion, rather than a single remote exploit; certification and audits aim to detect such multi-component attacks ^{[2] [3]}. Independent experts note residual risks from supply-chain issues, insider threats, or human procedural error; vendors emphasize layered defenses but acknowledge that operational discipline and transparent auditing are necessary complements to technical safeguards ^{[2] [3]}.

8. Bottom line: layered defenses, but not a panacea

Voting machine makers addressed 2024 tampering concerns by combining device design choices—air gaps, unique on-site credentials, redundant storage—with paper ballots and external certification to ensure detectability of tampering, while election officials relied on logic testing and audits to validate results ^{[1] [2] [3] [6]}. The consensus across manufacturers, officials, and certification frameworks is that paper trails plus procedural controls make widespread undetected tampering unlikely, but vigilance against misinformation, procedural lapses, and insider risks remains essential.