What are the four sections of the 25th Amendment and how do they differ?
Executive summary
The 25th Amendment has four sections: Section 1 makes the vice president the president if the president dies, resigns or is removed (e.g., Ford succeeded Nixon) [1] [2]. Section 2 requires the president to nominate a new vice president, who takes office after confirmation by both houses [3] [4]. Section 3 lets a president voluntarily transfer power temporarily to the vice president (used for medical procedures) [3] [5]. Section 4 permits the vice president and a majority of principal officers of the executive departments to declare the president unable to discharge duties, making the vice president Acting President unless Congress restores the president by two‑thirds votes in both houses; Section 4 has never been used [3] [6] [7].
1. Section 1 — Automatic succession: continuity, not controversy
Section 1 codifies the long‑standing practice that the vice president becomes president if the sitting president dies, resigns or is removed; that is how Gerald Ford became president after Nixon’s resignation in 1974 [1] [2]. The point of Section 1 was to remove ambiguity and make succession immediate and complete rather than leaving the vice president merely “acting” [8].
2. Section 2 — Filling a vacant vice presidency: presidential nomination plus congressional consent
Section 2 requires the president to nominate a new vice president when that office is vacant; the nominee takes office only after confirmation by both the House and Senate [3] [4]. This mechanism was used in the 1970s twice: Nixon nominated Gerald Ford to replace Spiro Agnew, then Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller after he became president [2].
3. Section 3 — Voluntary, temporary transfer of power: routine and institutionalized
Section 3 allows a president to declare temporarily that he or she is unable to discharge the duties of office, transferring authority to the vice president as Acting President for the duration of the incapacity. Presidents have used this for medical procedures—Reagan in 1985, George W. Bush in 2002, and Joe Biden once in 2021—showing it is a practical, low‑drama tool for short absences [5] [3].
4. Section 4 — Involuntary transfer for incapacity: the high bar and political reality
Section 4 authorizes the vice president and a majority of Cabinet “principal officers” (or a body Congress may specify) to declare the president unable to perform duties and make the vice president Acting President; the president can contest the declaration, at which point Congress must decide by two‑thirds votes in both houses to sustain the transfer [3] [6]. Scholars and analysts emphasize that Section 4 was intentionally made difficult to invoke and has never been used; it is reserved for clear incapacity, not policy disagreements [9] [7].
5. Where the sections differ — permanence, initiator, and threshold
The sections differ along three axes: permanence (Section 1 effects a permanent succession; Section 3 is explicitly temporary; Section 4 can be temporary or lead to removal if Congress concurs); who initiates the action (Section 3 is initiated by the president; Section 2 by the president’s nomination plus congressional confirmation; Section 4 by the vice president and Cabinet; Section 1 is automatic); and the burden of proof/threshold (Section 4 requires majority of Cabinet plus potential two‑thirds congressional supermajorities to finalize a contested removal, making it the highest hurdle) [1] [3] [6].
6. Practical and political limits — legal clarity versus political reality
Legal commentators note the amendment fills gaps left by prior crises but leaves some definitions unresolved—most notably what constitutes “inability” under Section 4—and the Supreme Court has not definitively interpreted those contours [8]. Analysts also stress the amendment’s design protects the presidency: the structure and high congressional thresholds make forcible removal through Section 4 politically and practically difficult [9] [6].
7. Historical usage and near‑misses — what the record shows
Sections 1 and 2 have been used in high‑stakes moments in the 1970s, Section 3 has been used several times for medical procedures, and Section 4 has been considered in crises but never invoked; Reagan’s team prepared Section 4 documentation after his 1981 shooting and aides contemplated it in 1987, but it has remained unused to date [5] [7] [2].
Limitations and sources: This account synthesizes the legal text and historical record as reported in the provided sources; it does not attempt to resolve open legal debates about “inability” beyond what those sources state. Key references: Law Library/Constitution Annotated and Cornell LII for text and mechanics [8] [10], historical usages [2] [5], and policy analysis on Section 4’s political difficulty [9] [6].