Fact check: What is a super majority

1. How the Concept Is Defined and Why It Matters

All analyses converge on a single, authoritative point: a supermajority is a voting rule that requires more than half the votes to approve important actions, with the purpose of ensuring broader consensus or protecting minority interests. Merriam-Webster and Ballotpedia give the definitional baseline—supermajority is simply a requirement above a simple majority—without fixing a single percentage, signaling that context determines the exact threshold ^{[1] [3]}. Wikipedia and multiple overviews name specific common thresholds—three-fifths, two-thirds, and three-quarters—illustrating that legal texts and organizational bylaws supply the exact numbers where they apply ^{[2] [4]}. The consistent framing across sources shows that supermajorities are a procedural tool to impose greater agreement for weighty decisions, not a single uniform standard.

2. Where Supermajorities Are Used and the Stakes Involved

The sources describe a wide range of settings for supermajorities, from constitutional amendments and legislative procedural rules to corporate shareholder agreements and ballot measures. Ballotpedia documents federal and state examples—such as a two-thirds requirement for Congress-driven constitutional amendments—highlighting how supermajorities affect foundational lawmaking ^[3]. Corporate analyses emphasize that shareholders often set supermajority thresholds between roughly 67% and 90% for strategic decisions like mergers, where broad consensus reduces the risk of coercive or short-term maneuvers ^[6]. State-level ballot rules vary: some states require supermajorities to amend constitutions or approve certain expenditures, which changes the campaign dynamics and the burden of persuasion on proponents ^[5]. These contexts show that the stakes rise with the threshold because higher bars can block change even when a majority favors it.

3. Common Thresholds and the Practical Effects They Produce

Analysts repeatedly cite three practical threshold bands: three-fifths (~60%), two-thirds (~66.7%), and three-quarters (75%), and they show how each level produces different political outcomes. A three-fifths rule is cited as a moderate supermajority often used for procedural safeguards; two-thirds is typical for constitutional or high-stakes parliamentary actions; three-quarters is used where near-unanimity is desired to change foundational norms ^{[2] [4]}. The higher the threshold, the greater the ability of a sizable minority to block changes—this is the intended design where protecting entrenched rules or minority rights is prioritized. Conversely, critics note that very high thresholds can create gridlock and entrenchment, making reforms difficult even with sustained majority support ^{[2] [5]}.

4. Conflicting Framings: Protection vs. Entrenchment

The sources present two competing rationales for supermajorities that shape political debate: one frames them as protections for minority rights and deliberation, the other as mechanisms that can entrench existing power or impede democratic change. Ballotpedia and rule-oriented overviews stress supermajorities as tools to ensure that major constitutional or corporate shifts have broad backing ^{[3] [4]}. At the same time, summaries and critiques note that high thresholds empower minorities to block widely supported measures, potentially stalling necessary reforms or being used strategically by interest groups to maintain the status quo ^{[2] [5]}. Both framings are documented across the source set, so evaluating a specific supermajority rule requires looking at who benefits and what decision is at stake.

5. Comparative Observations and What’s Omitted

Across the assembled analyses, there is consistency in the core definition and typical thresholds, but the record omits granular empirical data on how often supermajorities change outcomes in specific jurisdictions and the partisan uses of these rules in recent elections. The sources provide descriptive and normative accounts—definitions and typical uses—without a comprehensive dataset showing frequency of blockage or the distribution of thresholds by state or corporate charter ^{[1] [5] [6]}. To judge a supermajority’s democratic legitimacy in a given case, one must combine these definitional insights with empirical study of local practice, patterns of use by political actors, and the comparative consequences for minority protection versus policy paralysis ^{[2] [4]}.