Which African countries have accused Israel of operating spy networks?

1. Leaked intelligence assessments: names and allegations

Reports based on leaked or internal African intelligence documents — for example South African State Security Agency cables and allied reporting — accuse Israel of conducting covert influence and intelligence operations in Africa and name Sudan and Kenya among states where Israel is alleged to have “set up a communications system” and “exposed” other foreign spy networks, while South African assessments assert Israel has “fuelled insurrection” and engaged in arms and resource-related meddling ^{[1] [3]}. Those sources present these assertions as intelligence assessments rather than adjudicated facts ^[1].

2. Spyware and private vendors: a distinct but related track

Independent technical investigations led by Citizen Lab and summarized by outlets say several African governments use surveillance platforms developed by Israeli firms (Circles, NSO/Pegasus), with Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe identified as users of Circles‑related tools; Ghana and other countries have been reported as buyers of Pegasus‑family spyware ^{[2] [4] [5]}. These reports document commercial sales and deployments of intrusive tools to governments — a different category from state‑run foreign espionage but one that functionally enables secret surveillance inside and sometimes across borders ^{[2] [5]}.

3. How sources distinguish state espionage vs. commercial surveillance

Available reporting shows two strands: (a) intelligence‑community claims alleging Israeli state services ran clandestine networks in African states (e.g., Sudan, Kenya, South Africa in leaked cables), and (b) forensic and NGO research documenting African governments’ use of Israeli‑made spyware sold by private companies (e.g., Circles/NSO customers) ^{[1] [2] [5]}. Many articles and analyses caution that private‑sector cyberweapons are part of Israel’s diplomatic outreach, making attribution to the Israeli government politically and legally complex ^[4].

4. Examples most commonly cited in current reporting

• Sudan: intelligence documents cited in reporting accuse Israel of “fuelling insurrection” and building communications systems able to eavesdrop on presidential telecoms ^[3].
• Kenya: cited both in leaked cables — alleging cooperation and safe houses — and in technical reports as a country where Israeli tools have been used ^{[1] [2]}.
• South Africa: South African intelligence assessments in the leaked material accuse Israel of undermining regional stability and resource appropriation ^[1].
• Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Ghana: appear primarily in NGO/forensic work as states using Israeli commercial spyware products ^{[2] [4] [5]}.

5. What the sources do not (yet) confirm

None of the provided sources supplies an authoritative international legal finding that the Israeli government itself operated all of these networks; instead, the material mixes leaked intelligence judgments, press reporting and technical forensic work on private spyware vendors. Available sources do not mention a single internationally ratified ruling that Israel as a state ran each named network ^{[1] [2]}.

6. Competing perspectives and motivations in the record

Leaked African intelligence files and advocacy outlets frame Israeli activity as strategic influence‑building and support for repressive tools ^{[1] [6]}. Conversely, materials documenting commercial spyware emphasize market transactions and private‑sector responsibility, which Israeli authorities and vendors sometimes contest or do not publicly confirm in the sources provided ^{[2] [4]}. The framing differences reflect implicit agendas: intelligence services justify warnings of foreign interference, NGOs prioritize human‑rights harms from surveillance, and vendor/state denials (not present in these sources) typically stress lawful sales and export controls ^{[1] [2]}.

7. Bottom line for readers

Reporting and leaked documents identify multiple African countries tied to alleged Israeli espionage or to the use of Israeli cyber‑surveillance tools — Sudan, Kenya and South Africa show up in intelligence leaks, while Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Ghana are named in technical/NGO investigations of Israeli commercial spyware ^{[1] [2] [4] [5]}. However, the evidence in these sources mixes state intelligence allegations and commercial‑vendor activity; available sources do not provide a single, definitive list of countries that have legally or officially “accused” Israel’s government of operating clandestine foreign spy networks ^{[1] [2]}.