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Which African governments have publicly accused Israel of running espionage networks and when were the accusations made?
Executive summary
A number of African governments have been reported to use Israeli-made cyber-surveillance tools and spyware — with reporting and research naming Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Malawi and South Sudan in different contexts and timeframes (citations vary by report) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]. Available sources do not present a single authoritative list of governments that have "publicly accused Israel of running espionage networks"; rather, reporting and research document purchases or use of Israeli companies’ tools by African states and public criticism from activists and civil-society groups about those ties [1] [2] [3].
1. What the journalism and research actually say — purchases and use, not formal government accusations
Investigations such as the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab and subsequent reporting describe government agencies in Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe as using surveillance systems developed by Israeli-linked firms (Circles, NSO-related companies) to target opposition figures, activists and journalists [1] [2]. Other reporting and analysis add Ghana, Malawi and South Sudan to lists of African states that have purchased or used Israeli-origin surveillance or security equipment [3] [4] [5]. These sources document sales, installations and alleged misuse; they do not always record formal, public statements by those African governments accusing the Israeli state itself of operating espionage networks [1] [2].
2. Who is doing the accusing — activists, researchers, journalists, not always states
Many of the accusations in the public record come from civil-society actors, opposition politicians and investigative researchers. For example, opposition spokespeople and Citizen Lab’s report have publicly alleged that Israeli companies’ tools were used by Botswana, Kenya, Zambia and others to surveil dissidents [1] [2]. Opinion pieces and regional analyses frame these sales as part of a broader “spyware diplomacy” that links Israeli industry and diplomatic ties across Africa [3]. That pattern means critiques are often aimed at Israeli companies and the role of Israel’s export licensing, rather than standing formal accusations by African governments that “Israel is running espionage networks” [3] [2].
3. Timing: when these allegations and reports appeared
Citizen Lab’s "Running in Circles" reporting that tied several African states to Circles systems circulated in 2021 and generated follow-up commentary in regional outlets in 2021–2022 [1] [2]. Coverage and analysis about broader Israeli spyware exports — including reporting on Pegasus/NSO connections and country purchases — date from the mid‑2010s through 2024, with renewed reporting and commentary into 2022–2024 that names Ghana, Nigeria, Morocco, Malawi and Zambia among buyers/users [3] [4]. Academic work surveying Israel–Africa security ties and alleged misuse of Israeli-exported equipment includes multi‑year research and appeared in analyses by 2025 [5]. Available sources do not supply a single date on which an African government publicly accused Israel itself of running espionage networks; instead, public accusations and reports were published at different times by different actors [1] [2] [3].
4. Disagreements and limitations in the record
Sources differ on emphasis and scope. Citizen Lab and investigative outlets focus on specific companies and technical traces linking tools to client states [1] [2]. Opinion and advocacy pieces frame these sales as a diplomatic practice or “spyware diplomacy” that serves Israeli foreign-policy aims [3]. Academic work highlights security cooperation and equipment transfers and links them to human‑rights risks [5]. None of the supplied sources is a formal African-government statement declaring that “Israel runs espionage networks” on the continent; available sources instead document sales, use, and criticism of Israeli firms and export approvals [1] [3] [5].
5. What would count as a formal accusation — and what the sources lack
A formal government accusation would be an official statement from an African state explicitly charging Israel (the state or its services) with operating espionage networks inside that country. The provided reporting shows activists and researchers making such charges about companies and equipment, and documents governments using Israeli-linked tools — but does not provide examples of African governments issuing those exact formal accusations in the public record covered here [1] [2] [3]. Therefore, asserting that specific African governments publicly accused Israel of running espionage networks would go beyond what these sources substantiate.
6. How to follow up if you need a definitive list or dates
To get a rigorously sourced list and dates of formal state-to-state accusations, consult primary materials: official African government press releases, foreign‑ministry statements, parliamentary records and contemporaneous local press coverage. The current sources are strong on investigative reporting about Israeli companies’ sales and on civil‑society accusations, but they do not supply explicit, dated government declarations that “Israel is running espionage networks” [1] [2] [3].