Which income groups most likely to support Trump in 2025?
Executive summary
Across multiple post‑2024 analyses, the clearest signal is that Trump’s 2024/early‑2025 coalition was unusually strong among lower‑income and economically distressed voters and counties — especially households under roughly $50,000 (and in some exit‑poll slices, under $30,000) — even as sizeable support also persisted in middle‑income cohorts and some higher‑income segments, producing a complex, non‑monolithic income story [1] [2] [3].
1. Lower‑income and transfer‑dependent voters were particularly receptive
County‑level work by the Economic Innovation Group finds that Trump overperformed in places that rely heavily on transfer income — he received 63% of the vote in counties where at least a quarter of personal income comes from transfers — a strong indicator that economically fragile, lower‑income communities swung hard toward him [1]. National exit‑poll and aggregated reporting likewise show unusually high Trump shares among the poorest income brackets: in ten key‑state exit polling, 46% of voters with household incomes of $30,000 or less reported voting for Trump [2]. Contemporary polling and coverage also flagged low‑income voters as both volatile and central to Trump’s post‑2024 standing, with approval and turnout among sub‑$50,000 households closely watched [3].
2. Economic distress and “left‑behind” places matter more than a single income cut‑point
Analysts emphasize that county economic conditions — unemployment, poverty, and low median household income — correlated with shifts toward Trump, suggesting it’s not only individual income but the broader local economic context that drives support [1]. Financially strained counties, not merely individuals measured by a single income threshold, were more likely to move toward Trump, which helps explain why lower‑income voters and residents of transfer‑dependent places appear disproportionately represented in his coalition [1].
3. Working‑class narratives fit some data but not all; middle incomes also feature
Longstanding caveats from electoral research apply: earlier work has shown that Trump’s voters can, in aggregate, have median household incomes at or above some national medians, complicating a simple “poor = pro‑Trump” storyline [4] [5]. The Voter Study Group and FiveThirtyEight analyses emphasize heterogeneity — several distinct Trump voter types include both lower‑income “American Preservationists” and more moderate‑income “Staunch Conservatives,” meaning middle‑income cohorts remain an important part of his base [5] [4].
4. Shifts within demographic subgroups point to income‑education interactions
Interactive demographic tools and state exit analyses show the biggest Trump gains in 2024 came among lower‑education, lower‑income slices of racial and age groups — for example, younger Black voters with a high‑school education or less and Hispanic men under certain income thresholds shifted noticeably toward Trump [6]. That pattern indicates income matters most when it interacts with education and local context; low income combined with lower education often predicts higher Trump support in the 2024 data [6].
5. Caveats, competing readings and limits of available reporting
Public datasets (Census voting tables) provide comprehensive turnout and income cross‑tabs but require careful, state‑by‑state parsing to avoid overgeneralizing from selective exit polls [7]. Some outlets and scholars stress that Trump’s appeal is not confined only to the poorest Americans and that richer precincts and middle‑income voters also contributed to his coalition — a counterpoint supported by earlier median‑income findings and voter‑typology work [4] [5]. The sources provided do not supply a single, definitive income breakpoint for 2025 support, only converging evidence that lower‑income and economically distressed areas were especially likely to back Trump while middle incomes remained important.
6. Bottom line
The most likely income groups to support Trump in the 2025 period are lower‑income households and voters in economically distressed, transfer‑reliant counties (notably households under ~$50k and a pronounced signal under $30k in some exit polls), with continued and meaningful backing from certain middle‑income cohorts; income matters most in combination with local economic conditions and education, so the coalition is broad but skewed toward economically vulnerable places [1] [2] [6] [4].