Who had authority to approve DC National Guard deployments before Jan 6, 2021?

1. The odd legal status that put the DC Guard under federal control

The District of Columbia is not a state, so the District’s Guard is unique: the D.C. National Guard’s commanding general technically reports to the President rather than a governor. That federal relationship distinguishes DCNG from state National Guards and helps explain why local leaders cannot unilaterally order DC Guard troops — the legal and historic framework places DC Guard authority in the federal chain ^{[1] [2]}.

2. How authority was delegated in practice before Jan. 6

Although the President is the ultimate commander, a 1969 executive‑order framework and subsequent Pentagon practice put operational approval for DCNG activations in the Defense Department’s hands. The Defense Secretary had delegated control to the Secretary of the Army, who exercised that authority through the Army chain — so, before changes made after Jan. 6, requests commonly flowed to the Army Secretary and senior DoD staff for approval ^{[5] [2]}.

3. Who actually handled deployment requests on Jan. 6, 2021 — reporting and hearings

Contemporaneous reporting and later hearings described then‑Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy as the official who handled requests for Guard deployments in the District on Jan. 6, acting with consultation from senior Pentagon leaders including the acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley ^{[2] [6]}. Testimony and timelines indicate the DCNG commander could not unilaterally deploy some forces without higher authorization, and Pentagon officials reviewed and approved limited pre‑event activations ^[6].

4. Why critics say the chain of command mattered during the Capitol breach

Observers such as the Brennan Center argued the delayed deployment on Jan. 6 exposed a problematic, “outdated and dangerous” command structure: because DCNG was under federal control, local authorities could not rapidly order forces as a governor could in a state, and multiple layers of Pentagon approval were implicated in the time taken to send troops to the Capitol ^[1]. Some reporting and committee documents cite multi‑hour intervals between requests for help and approvals for Guard troop movements ^{[4] [6]}.

5. What the Pentagon changed after Jan. 6 and why

In late 2021 the Pentagon revised the approval process to streamline urgent deployments: Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin amended delegations so that the Defense Secretary — not the Army Secretary or lower staff — would be the sole approval authority for any request that would use DCNG personnel “participating directly in civilian law enforcement activities” or that required deployment within 48 hours of the request ^{[3] [4] [2]}. The change was framed as a response to questions about the speed and clarity of decision‑making during the Jan. 6 response ^{[3] [2]}.

6. Competing perspectives and remaining questions

The Pentagon and some official reviews have defended senior defense officials’ actions on Jan. 6 as appropriate under the existing chain of command ^[2]. Critics counter that the delegation to Army leadership and the federal control of DCNG created unnecessary friction and delay ^[1]. Available sources do not offer a single, uncontested causal chain showing that any one procedural rule alone produced the delay; public timelines, testimonies and later policy changes reveal disagreement about how much the command structure versus other factors (communications, rules of engagement, legal advice) contributed to the pace of deployment ^{[4] [6] [2]}.

7. Practical takeaway for readers

Before Jan. 6, 2021, authority to approve D.C. National Guard activations rested in the federal chain — delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army in practice — not with local city officials or a state governor; after the riot the Pentagon centralized urgent‑use approvals with the Defense Secretary to reduce friction for rapid deployments ^{[5] [3] [2]}.