Who within the Capitol Police chain of command had authority to request National Guard assistance on Jan. 6?

1. Who legally could ask for the Guard on Jan. 6 — the formal chain

On Jan. 6 the Capitol Police Board was the body with authority to request District of Columbia National Guard assistance to the Capitol; the Board’s members were the House Sergeant at Arms, the Senate Sergeant at Arms and the Architect of the Capitol, and the USCP chief was required to submit a request to that Board for approval rather than act alone ^{[2] [1]}.

2. Where the chief fit in — operational actor but not decision maker

Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund repeatedly sought Guard help on Jan. 6 and lobbied the Board, but Senate and House oversight reporting concluded the chief did not possess unilateral legal authority to summon the Guard that day and therefore had to seek Board approval — a process the oversight report says contributed to delay ^{[5] [2]}.

3. Multiple requests and disputed timing — contested factual accounts

Multiple timelines and witnesses say Sund and other local officials requested Guard assistance beginning in the early afternoon and that authorization was not granted quickly; contemporaneous testimony and the Pentagon’s timeline record separate calls and requests that were delayed before DoD approved deployment ^{[6] [7] [8]}. Committees found disagreements among Board members and USCP officials about when and how requests were made and whether unanimity was required ^[2].

4. Why the Pentagon became a bottleneck

Even after the Board-authorized path, deployment required Defense Department permission to employ the D.C. National Guard in the federal law-enforcement role; testimony by Major General William Walker and Pentagon officials documents multi-hour delays between requests and final permission to deploy ^{[7] [8]}. JustSecurity and oversight timelines show repeated attempts by local officials to secure Guard support that encountered DoD reluctance or procedural hold-ups ^[6].

5. Reforms adopted: giving the chief unilateral request power

Bipartisan investigators recommended simplifying the process; Congress enacted the Capitol Police Emergency Assistance Act in December 2021, which explicitly empowers the Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police to request the D.C. National Guard or federal law‑enforcement agencies in emergencies without prior Capitol Police Board approval ^{[3] [4] [1]}. Politico and Senate press materials characterize the law as removing a bureaucratic hurdle that delayed help on Jan. 6 ^{[9] [4]}.

6. Competing narratives and political finger‑pointing

Some public figures and outlets sought to assign responsibility to Congressional leaders or the Speaker; fact‑checking and committee work note that the Board, not the Speaker or individual members of Congress, was the formal decisionmaker on National Guard requests and that Board members and the chief have disputed each other’s accounts ^{[10] [2]}. Available sources do not mention any evidence that Speaker Pelosi personally blocked a Guard request; public testimony indicates she supported deployment when presented with the recommendation ^[10].

7. What this means for accountability and future response

Oversight reports framed the Jan. 6 delays as a system failure of layered procedures — a chief who had to seek Board approval, disagreement among Board members about decision rules, and DoD authorization requirements — rather than a single missing phone call ^{[2] [6]}. Congress’ post‑Jan. 6 law directly addresses the chief’s lack of unilateral authority, but Pentagon and interagency decision practices remain relevant to timely Guard deployment ^{[3] [7]}.

Limitations: this account is built only from the supplied reporting and committee materials; available sources do not mention other internal memos or undisclosed communications that may bear on precise timing or who first authorized specific steps beyond what the cited oversight and media accounts describe ^{[2] [7]}.