Who on the Capitol Police Board made the decision not to request the National Guard before Jan. 6 and what did they testify?
Executive summary
The Capitol Police Board—comprised of the House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving, the Senate Sergeant at Arms Michael Stenger, and the Architect of the Capitol—decided on January 3, 2021, not to request a pre‑positioned District of Columbia National Guard presence at the Capitol; that decision and the events that followed were the subject of sharply divergent testimonies from then‑Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund and the two Sergeants at Arms [1] [2] [3].
1. Who sat on the Capitol Police Board and who opposed a pre‑deployment
The statutory Capitol Police Board is the three‑member body that authorizes National Guard requests for the Capitol: the House Sergeant at Arms (Paul Irving), the Senate Sergeant at Arms (Michael Stenger) and the Architect of the Capitol (then the third member) [1] [2]. According to sworn testimony and investigative reports, Chief Steven Sund told lawmakers he approached two Board members—Irving and Stenger—on January 3 about Guard support and was rebuffed; Sund says he was denied by the two Sergeants‑at‑Arms over concerns including “optics” and assessment of the intelligence threat [3] [2].
2. What Paul Irving testified he said and why he opposed a pre‑deployment
In post‑attack interviews and in the Select Committee report, Irving acknowledged the January 3 conversation with Sund and said he did not favor asking for the Guard ahead of time, citing that the intelligence did not support such a visible military posture and expressing concern about the optics of troops at the Capitol; Sund testified he did not push Irving on those points [2]. The Select Committee recorded Irving’s account that tactical security decisions were normally made by the Board without consulting congressional leaders, framing his actions as an exercise of that delegated authority [2].
3. What Michael Stenger’s role and testimony amounted to
Michael Stenger, the Senate Sergeant at Arms, likewise participated in the Board discussions and later resigned; reports and committee findings show Stenger and Irving both declined Sund’s January 3 formal request and that Stenger suggested Sund informally “lean forward” with Guard contacts while holding off a formal Board request—an approach the committee said contributed to delay and confusion [4] [5].
4. Sund’s testimony: denied requests, multiple refusals, and later pleas
Steven Sund has testified under oath that he repeatedly sought National Guard assistance—saying he was denied on January 3 and that during the January 6 attack he lobbied the Board and was initially blocked from making a formal request, then later granted permission only after repeated pleas; Sund also told congressional panels he did not push harder on January 3 in part because Irving cited intelligence and optics concerns [3] [2] [5].
5. Disputes, missing transcripts and why accounts diverge
Investigators note there is no contemporaneous transcript of some key conversations among Sund, Irving and Stenger, and the Committees concluded that differing recollections and the absence of a clear record make it impossible to pin precise timing or the exact contours of the denial—Congressional staff flagged that ambiguity as a central reason the Guard was not pre‑positioned and that Sund spent precious time trying to obtain Board approvals during the attack [4].
6. Alternative explanations and competing testimony about “optics” and delays
Board members and some Pentagon witnesses emphasized procedural constraints and disputed simplistic explanations such as a single “optics” order; senior military officials testified they never advised against deployment for optics reasons and defended their timelines, and the record includes multiple institutional failures—statutory Board approval rules, Pentagon sign‑offs imposed the day before, and interagency confusion—that together shaped the delayed Guard response [6] [7] [8].
7. What this means for accountability and statutory change
The conflicting testimonies—Irving and Stenger saying they denied a pre‑deployment based on intelligence and concern about optics, and Sund saying his repeated advance requests were rebuffed—helped drive later changes in authority (Congress passed legislation to let the Capitol Police Chief request federal assistance without full Board unanimity) and remain central to debates over responsibility for the failure to anticipate and deter the January 6 violence [1] [4].