Why did the Russia-Ukraine conflict start
Executive summary
The Russia–Ukraine war began with Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, driven by Kremlin leadership seeking to control Ukrainian territory and political orientation; Moscow’s aims have included seizing territory (notably Donetsk, Luhansk and other regions) and installing a Russia-friendly government, goals that Putin reiterated as unchanged in 2025 [1]. Western and Ukrainian sources characterise the campaign as a Russian effort to outlast Ukraine and the West in a war of attrition; Russia continues to press territorial demands at the negotiating table while Ukrainian forces resist and strike Russian infrastructure [2] [3].
1. The immediate spark: Russia’s full‑scale invasion and stated aims
Russia launched a full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022; Russian leadership framed operations in terms of “special military” goals tied to the Donetsk and Luhansk areas but initially pursued much broader objectives — including capturing Kyiv and removing Ukraine’s government — before recalibrating to focus on eastern and southern Ukraine after early setbacks [1]. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly rejected peace proposals that do not meet his original war aims, and in late 2025 he reiterated unwillingness to compromise, underlining Moscow’s continuity of purpose [1].
2. Longstanding Kremlin narratives and territorial claims
Kremlin rhetoric has repeatedly asserted historical and political claims to parts of Ukraine — narratives resurfacing in 2025 around cities like Odesa and Mykolaiv — which Russian officials and deputies use to justify continued military pressure and to portray those areas as “ancestral” or inherently Russian [2] [4]. Analysts cited by ISW and reporting note Moscow’s campaign blends military force with cognitive/information warfare designed to make a Russian victory or territorial concessions seem inevitable [1].
3. Strategy: attrition and protraction
Multiple English‑language analysts and officials present a consistent strategic view: Moscow appears prepared to wage a war of attrition, betting it can outlast Western support for Kyiv and Ukraine’s endurance. U.S. and other Western commentators have warned that Putin’s negotiating posture assumes Russia can sustain losses and coerce concessions over time [2] [5]. Reporting in late 2025 documents Russia’s ongoing offensive operations and high‑intensity strikes, which fit a protracted campaign rather than a quick occupation [6] [7].
4. Ukrainian resistance and reciprocal strikes
Ukraine has not accepted territorial concessions and has struck back, including long‑range strikes on Russian energy and defense infrastructure in 2025 — part of a broader campaign to degrade Russia’s warfighting capacity and pressure Moscow politically and militarily [3] [6]. Ground fighting remains intense; for example, accounts from November 2025 describe heavy combat around Pokrovsk with both sides claiming gains and losses [8] [9].
5. Mobilisation, manpower and the human cost
Russia has had to mobilise and source fresh manpower repeatedly, employing a range of recruitment methods that independent reporting describes as an evolving and sometimes coercive apparatus — from local recruiters to more informal markets — which sustains Moscow’s capacity for prolonged combat [10]. Open‑source reporting and ISW assessments repeatedly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, and casualty and operational claims highlight a brutal and large‑scale conflict across 2022–2025 [8] [7].
6. Diplomacy and the limits of peace plans
Through 2025, the United States and intermediaries circulated peace proposals; Moscow publicly rejected key elements that did not meet its territorial demands. Kremlin spokespeople and senior officials framed negotiations as requiring radical changes to Western drafts, signalling Russia’s intent to preserve maximalist goals rather than accept compromise that leaves Ukraine sovereign in its pre‑invasion borders [3] [1]. Western officials and analysts say those disagreements make a near‑term settlement unlikely unless Russia alters its negotiating demands [5].
7. What the sources do not say
Available sources do not mention exhaustive origins going beyond Kremlin policy choices, such as detailed internal deliberations inside the Russian leadership prior to 2022, nor do they provide a single agreed academic causal model that reduces the conflict to one factor; reporting instead emphasises a mixture of territorial ambition, security narratives, and political objectives (not found in current reporting). The provided materials also do not offer a comprehensive listing of all diplomatic efforts since 2022 (not found in current reporting).
Conclusion
The conflict began with a Russian decision to invade and pursue broad political and territorial goals that Kremlin officials have maintained across subsequent years; Western and Ukrainian responses transformed the campaign into a protracted war characterised by attrition, heavy fighting, reciprocal strikes on infrastructure, and stalled diplomacy as sources show in 2025 [1] [2] [3].