If Ukraine can hold back Russia on its own why can’t Europe
Executive summary
Ukraine’s ability to blunt and attrit Russian forces reflects unusually high mobilization, sustained Western materiel support, and the fact that Russia’s offensive is concentrated on Ukrainian territory; Europe, by contrast, faces different geography, political constraints, degraded force structures, and deterrence calculations that make “holding back Russia on its own” a far more complex proposition [1] [2] [3].
1. The different fights: defense on home soil versus defending the continent
Ukraine’s military is fighting for survival on its own territory, which creates maximal political will to mobilize people and economic output for war in ways most European democracies have not done; analysts note Ukraine fields a military “larger and with more recent experience than any of its European backers,” and Kyiv has pushed very high defense spending and mobilization levels that European states have not matched [1] [2].
2. Scale and force structure: Europe’s latent potential, but current shortfalls
Europe as a whole possesses the industrial base and technology to build a military capable of matching Russia over time, but current force structures suffer from decades of cuts, fragmentation in procurement, and shortfalls in ready ground forces and ammunition—shortfalls that analysts say would take years and coordinated rearmament to fix [4] [5] [3].
3. Geography, frontage and logistics: why holding a line in Europe is harder
A direct attack on NATO-Europe would present a vastly different operational problem than the Ukraine war: wider frontages, multiple vulnerable borders, and the need to rapidly mobilize and sustain large conventional forces across space and time, conditions that European militaries are not currently optimized to meet without massive increases in personnel and stockpiles [5] [6].
4. Nuclear posture and escalation control: Europe’s deterrence constraints
Europe’s conventional calculations are conditioned by the centrality of the nuclear factor in Moscow’s escalation strategy; IFRI and others highlight that Russia’s nuclear rhetoric and deployments (including tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus) shape how both Europe and its American ally calibrate the risks of direct confrontation [7].
5. The United States factor: political and material linchpin for European defense
Multiple reviews stress that NATO cohesion and Washington’s commitment have been key deterrents; Europe’s ability to “go it alone” is therefore not just a matter of tanks or planes but of sustained U.S. force projection, intelligence, and logistics support—without massive U.S. support Europeans would confront significant gaps in air superiority, integrated air and missile defense, and stockpiles [7] [3].
6. Ukraine’s asymmetric learning curve versus Europe’s peacetime readiness
Ukraine has innovated cost‑effective, mobilization‑based approaches (drones, mines, reserve mobilization) and expanded a wartime defense industrial base rapidly—tactics and production systems born of necessity that are not automatically transferable to European militaries, which must balance peacetime politics, budgets, and interoperability across many states [1] [2] [3].
7. Political will, economic costs and domestic trade‑offs
European governments face higher political barriers to full wartime mobilization—energy shocks, inflation, and domestic economic pain tied to sanctions and support for Ukraine have already illustrated the nonmilitary costs Europe incurs, making sustained, open-ended continental rearmament politically fraught without a clear existential trigger [3].
8. Conclusion: Ukraine’s role is necessary but not sufficient for European defense
Ukraine’s resistance has tied down a large share of Russian military power and bought time for European rearmament; scholars argue Europe could match Russia given unified, sustained investment by 2030, but that outcome depends on political cohesion, massive industrial scaling, and continued external support—factors currently incomplete [4] [7] [5].