Why doesn't the House of Representatives require 60 votes for legislation?

1. Why the House Uses a Simple Majority — Origins and Constitutional Grounding

The Constitution and longstanding chamber procedures underpin the House’s reliance on a simple majority for ordinary lawmaking, and the House’s rules explicitly provide for passage by a majority of members present and voting, which in practice is usually 218 if all 435 are present. This arrangement reflects the framers’ design of the House as the chamber closest to the people with faster decisionmaking, and contemporary summaries of House voting and quorum rules confirm that supermajority requirements are reserved for specific, high‑stakes actions such as veto overrides or constitutional amendments rather than routine statutes ^{[1] [3]}. The contrast with the Senate is procedural, not constitutional: the Constitution prescribes some supermajorities (two‑thirds, three‑fourths) for particular cases but leaves internal debate rules largely to each chamber, allowing the House to operate on simple‑majority norms ^[3].

2. The Senate’s 60‑Vote Reality — Filibuster, Cloture, and Historical Change

The practical need for 60 votes in the Senate arises from its filibuster and cloture rules rather than any universal congressional requirement; cloture, adopted in 1917 and adjusted in 1975 to three‑fifths (60 of 100 senators), is the mechanism senators use to cut off extended debate and allow a vote, creating an effective supermajority in many circumstances. Analysts note that the Senate’s unique procedures enable prolonged debate and minority leverage, prompting the frequent invocation of a 60‑vote threshold to proceed to final passage on controversial measures ^{[2] [4]}. The divergence between chambers is frequently emphasized: the Senate’s tradition of extended deliberation was institutionalized into rules that create thresholds that do not apply in the House, producing very different legislative dynamics ^{[2] [5]}.

3. When Supermajorities Still Matter in the House — Exceptions and Constitutional Requirements

Although ordinary House legislation requires only a simple majority, a small and well‑defined set of actions does require supermajorities, such as overriding a presidential veto or proposing constitutional amendments—actions governed by constitutional or statutory thresholds rather than ordinary procedure. Explanations of supermajority requirements emphasize that these higher thresholds are reserved for decisions the framers considered especially consequential; the three‑fifths or two‑thirds figures referenced in public discourse often relate to those special cases, not routine bills before the House ^{[3] [6]}. Therefore, claims that Congress broadly needs 60 percent for legislation misapply Senate cloture practice or conflate special constitutional thresholds with everyday House voting rules ^[3].

4. Different Rules, Different Politics — Strategic and Institutional Consequences

The procedural contrast leads to distinct strategic landscapes: the House’s majority rule concentrates power in the majority party and its leadership, enabling swifter action but less minority leverage, while the Senate’s cloture barrier disperses influence and incentivizes cross‑party negotiation or minority obstruction. Commentators and institutional analyses point out that the Senate’s 60‑vote dynamic produces higher transaction costs and often forces incremental or bipartisan compromises, whereas the House’s structure yields more predictable outcomes when one party controls a majority ^{[5] [6]}. Observers with reform agendas will highlight these features differently—those favoring majoritarian democracy argue the House model prevents obstruction, while proponents of Senate filibuster defenders stress deliberative checks—both perspectives reflect underlying institutional incentives embedded in chamber rules ^{[5] [2]}.

5. Bottom Line: Procedure Explains the Threshold, Not a Single Rule Change

The absence of a universal 60‑vote requirement in the House is not an oversight or anomaly but the consequence of distinct constitutional assignments and chamber rules that intentionally diverge: the House follows simple‑majority norms for ordinary legislation, the Senate’s cloture rule often produces a 60‑vote hurdle, and only specified actions across Congress demand supermajorities under constitutional or statutory commands. Recent explanatory accounts reiterate this separation of powers and procedures, showing that reform debates often conflate Senate cloture practice with House voting standards; understanding the difference clarifies why the House does not—and by design need not—require 60 votes to pass most legislation ^{[1] [2] [3]}.