Why is the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding occupation only applied to Israel within their mandated territory, but not to real occupations like Turkey in Cyprus or China in Tibet?
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Executive summary
States, courts and international agencies repeatedly treat the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV) as the primary legal framework for occupation and protection of civilians; the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and many human-rights NGOs have applied it to Israel’s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, prompting calls for a High Contracting Parties conference and statements that Israel’s conduct amounts to grave breaches [1] [2] [3]. Sources show strong political contestation over enforcement: Switzerland cancelled a planned 2025 HCP conference because of “profound differences,” and human-rights groups say political calculations—not legal silence—explain uneven international action [4] [5] [3].
1. Why GC IV is central and broadly applicable — but politically invoked unevenly
The ICRC and treaty practice treat GC IV as the cornerstone protecting civilians in occupation and international armed conflict; the ICRC updated its authoritative Commentary in 2025 to reflect decades of state practice and jurisprudence, underscoring GC IV’s broad legal reach [6] [7]. The Convention has near-universal ratification (the four 1949 Conventions ratified by 196 states, per treaty records), so legal availability is not the barrier [8]. Yet application in practice depends on states, courts and international bodies choosing to invoke the rules and to enforce them, a political decision as much as a legal one [3] [5].
2. The Israel example: legal findings, political follow-through, and civil-society pressure
Recent international legal attention has concentrated on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory: a July 2024 ICJ advisory opinion and subsequent reporting conclude that Israel is bound by occupation law and that its conduct has been characterized by grave breaches, prompting UNGA requests for a High Contracting Parties (HCP) conference and civil-society demands to enforce GC IV [1] [2] [9]. Human-rights groups — Amnesty, HRW, Al-Haq, Addameer — argue states have failed to fulfil Common Article 1 obligations and that political resistance blocked the 2025 HCP meeting, showing how political dynamics determine whether GC IV is operationalized [3] [10] [4] [9].
3. Other situations (Turkey/Cyprus, China/Tibet): available sources do not frame them the same way
The provided sources do not analyze Turkish forces in Cyprus or Chinese control in Tibet with respect to GC IV, and they do not explain why those situations are not the focus of recent HCP or ICJ actions; available sources do not mention Turkey in Cyprus or China in Tibet in the context of the 2024–2025 GC IV debates (not found in current reporting). That absence in the record means we cannot infer from these sources that GC IV is being selectively applied by law; instead, the sources show selective international attention driven by recent litigation, UN processes and advocacy campaigns [1] [4] [3].
4. Legal criteria vs. political choice: occupation law is technical, enforcement is political
GC IV and IHL doctrines define “occupation” and the occupying power’s duties; the ICRC’s updated Commentary consolidates that body of law and state practice so legal criteria exist [6] [7]. But the sources repeatedly document that States and international organs often hesitate to act: Switzerland cancelled a planned HCP conference because of “profound differences” among High Contracting Parties, and Amnesty accused states of putting political expediency over legal obligations [4] [3]. The evidence in these sources points to political fracture — not absence of legal rules — as the proximate reason some episodes receive concentrated GC IV enforcement efforts while others do not [5] [10].
5. Competing narratives and explicit agendas in the record
States and advocates frame the same facts differently: Israel’s mission called the HCP conference “politicization” targeted at Israel [11], while NGOs saw cancellation as an “international failure” to protect Palestinians and enforce GC IV [4] [3]. Advocacy groups (Addameer, Al-Haq) press HCPs to declare Israeli practices illegal and to treat Palestine as a party for purposes of the Convention; official diplomatic responses label these moves agenda-driven [1] [9] [11]. The sources show both legal arguments and political strategies at work; readers should note that declarations of selective application often reflect competing political objectives rather than a doctrinal inability of GC IV to cover other cases [10] [5].
6. Bottom line and limits of available reporting
The material in these sources establishes that GC IV is the universal legal instrument for occupation, that recent international jurisprudence and rights groups have focused enforcement claims on Israel and the OPT, and that political disagreement among states blocked a planned HCP response in 2025 [6] [1] [4] [3]. The sources do not address Turkey’s actions in Cyprus or China’s control of Tibet in the same debates, so they do not provide a documented legal explanation for differential attention in those contexts — only evidence that political choices determine where GC IV is pressed and enforced (not found in current reporting; p1_s5).