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Why do muslim rulers of today dont use their power to stop the genocide in Palestine?
Executive Summary
Muslim rulers’ response to the Gaza crisis is mixed: many have issued diplomatic condemnations, some have provided humanitarian aid, and a minority of religious leaders and civil society have called for concrete economic or political measures — yet sustained, coordinated state actions that could forcefully alter the conflict’s course are largely absent. This pattern reflects a combination of geopolitical constraints, economic dependencies, domestic politics, and divergent strategic priorities across Muslim-majority states, as documented in scholarly statements, public-opinion surveys, and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) communiqués between 2024 and 2025 [1] [2] [3].
1. What people claim — “Rulers do nothing,” and where that allegation comes from
The core claim is that Muslim rulers are not using their power to stop what many describe as a genocide in Gaza; that claim appears explicitly in public appeals by Muslim scholars and civil leaders who urge severing ties, embargoes, and opening borders to force Israel to stop its operations [1] [4]. These appeals, reported in August 2025, frame state inaction as a moral and strategic failure and rely on casualty tallies and descriptions of the humanitarian situation to justify extraordinary measures [1]. Parallel critiques come from civil society and media accounts describing individual countries’ policies — such as Albania’s deepening ties with Israel despite Muslim community objections — which illustrate disjunctions between popular sentiment and state conduct [5]. The charge of inaction therefore rests on both normative calls from religious leaders and observable diplomatic/normalization choices by certain governments.
2. State responses documented — rhetoric, limited measures, and appeals to law
Muslim-majority states and multilateral bodies have primarily responded through diplomatic condemnations, humanitarian assistance, and formal resolutions rather than coercive statecraft like embargoes or military intervention. The OIC issued resolutions condemning aggression, calling for ceasefires and respect for international law, and assigning monitoring and advocacy tasks to member bodies in 2024–2025 [3] [6]. Individual states have varied: some paused or reassessed normalization with Israel under public pressure, while others maintained or deepened ties. Signatories of the August 2025 scholar statement urged concrete state tools — control of oil, airspace, or trade — but those steps remain proposals rather than implemented policy across most capitals [4]. These documented responses show active diplomacy and humanitarian engagement but limited disruptive leverage employed against Israel’s military campaign.
3. Why rulers act cautiously — geopolitics, dependencies, and the fear of fallout
Analyses point to a set of structural constraints limiting bold action: dependence on Western security guarantees and aid, economic interdependence, concerns about domestic stability, and the risk of severe retaliation or escalation. Scholarly commentary in 2024 argued that many Arab regimes fear internal turbulence and have limited sovereign freedom to make high-risk foreign-policy moves without external backing [7]. Public-opinion data from February 2024 and June 2025 shows popular outrage and erosion of support for normalization with Israel, yet governments balance that against strategic ties with the United States and regional partners; this tension produces cautious, often symbolic policymaking rather than high-cost confrontations [2] [8]. The result is selective activism — humanitarian aid and condemnations — that stops short of the coercive measures proposed by activists.
4. Popular pressure versus government choices — a mounting democratic dilemma
Surveys by Arab Barometer and related studies show large majorities in the region viewing Israel’s actions as severe crimes and opposing normalization, and respondents often blame U.S. support more than Arab governments for enabling the conflict [2] [8]. This creates political pressure on rulers, reflected in condemnation from religious figures and mass activism like the nearly 300 Albanian Muslim leaders’ statement in August 2025 [5]. Yet governments calibrate policy to manage international alliances, economic priorities, and internal security. Where public outrage is strongest, governments sometimes adopt stronger rhetorical positions; where strategic dependencies are greatest, rhetoric stops short of coercive measures. The divergence between popular sentiment and state action explains much of the perception that rulers “do nothing.”
5. Where this leaves accountability — gaps, proposals, and the limits of moral suasion
The record through 2024–2025 shows repeated calls — from over 85–90 Muslim scholars in August 2025 to OIC resolutions in 2024 and 2025 — urging stronger measures; these proposals highlight available levers but also reveal political unwillingness to deploy them at scale [1] [4] [6]. Analysts argue that non-state actors have filled some resistance roles, while state actors pursue diplomacy and humanitarian relief within tight constraints [7]. The literature and statements signal a credibility gap: Muslim civil society and religious leaders demand transformative state action, while governments offer limited, risk-averse policies. Closing that gap would require coordinated, costly policies — such as collective embargoes or the use of critical airspace — which governments have so far judged too risky or costly to pursue.