What is the doctrine of abrogation (naskh) in Qur'anic interpretation and how has it affected rulings on war?
Executive summary
The doctrine of abrogation (naskh) holds that some Quranic rulings or texts may be superseded or modified by later revelations, a concept discussed and contested across Islamic history [1][2]. Debate about naskh has focused especially on whether later “sword” or martial verses override earlier peaceful commands and how that has been used to justify rules on warfare [3][4].
1. What naskh means in classical terms
Classical definitions describe naskh as the lifting or replacement of an earlier legal or practical ruling by a later one, with technical labels for the abrogating (nasikh) and abrogated (mansukh) texts [1][5]. Early commentators and later jurists used chronological ordering of Meccan and Medinan revelations to determine which rulings were later and therefore potentially decisive for law [2][6]. Some scholars framed abrogation as making exceptions rather than wholesale repeal, treating later texts as context-specific adjustments to prior norms [3].
2. Origins, acceptance and controversy among scholars
The concept emerged early in exegetical practice as scholars sought to reconcile apparently contradictory verses and hadith, and by the medieval period it was widely accepted in many legal schools though contested by some authorities [2][7]. Critics and revisionist voices argued that claims of abrogation were later scholarly constructions or methodological shortcuts that risked portraying divine speech as changeable [5][7]. The scope and mechanism of naskh—what counts as abrogated and by what evidence—remained a major fault line among Sunni and Shia jurists and among different madhahib [2][8].
3. Naskh and the jurisprudence of war: the core dispute
A focal application of naskh has been to verses about fighting: commentators who argue that certain Medinan “sword verses” supersede earlier peaceful Meccan injunctions treat the later martial rules as exception-setting for relations in wartime [4][3]. Opposing scholars insist that many peaceful verses retain force in their contexts and that martial verses address specific wartime contingencies rather than establishing perpetual commands to fight non‑Muslims [9][1]. This dispute shapes whether jurists read Quranic commands as conditional rules governing legitimate self‑defense and treaty relations, or as broader authorizations for offensive warfare [10][5].
4. Political uses, weaponized exegesis, and accusations of abuse
Histories of political Islam and critiques from both inside and outside the Muslim world document how claims of abrogation were sometimes mobilized by rulers and hawkish jurists to legitimize expansionist or coercive policies, an outcome critics label “weaponized exegesis” [10][11]. Conversely, polemical sources and some analysts frame abrogation as inherently enabling violence, arguing that selective appeals to later verses permit extremists to dismiss peaceful prescriptions [12][13]. Both perspectives acknowledge that the doctrine’s flexibility creates space for contestation and potential misuse in political struggles [10][5].
5. Contemporary reassessments and methodological cautions
Recent scholars and institutes urge more nuanced readings—treating abrogation as exception-making, emphasizing context, and warning against wholesale cancellation of reconciliation‑oriented verses—while also noting that historical misapplications justify vigilance [3][1]. Reformist and mainstream voices stress that rules of engagement in early Islamic sources were context‑dependent and thus must be read against principles prohibiting transgression and unlawful aggression found elsewhere in the Quran [9][3]. At the same time, some critics maintain that the doctrine as historically practised has been insufficiently constrained and therefore remains a live problem for jurisprudence and politics [5][10].
6. Conclusion
Naskh is a contested hermeneutical tool that classical scholars developed to resolve textual tension, and its application to verses on war has been decisive in shaping legal views about when fighting is lawful or obligatory versus exceptional and defensive [2][4]. The lasting effect is not uniform: while some traditions have used abrogation to elevate later martial rulings, substantial scholarly currents insist on context, limits, and retention of peaceful injunctions—making the doctrine as much a battleground of jurisprudential method as a single doctrinal license for violence [3][9].