In the Ten Commandments, is the prohibition on killing just against killing a Jew, or against killing anyone?
Executive summary
The Sixth Commandment in Exodus 20:13 is best understood by scholars and religious traditions not as a tribal injunction forbidding the killing of only fellow Israelites, but as a prohibition against unlawful killing (commonly translated “murder”) of human beings broadly; the Hebrew lo tirtzach is usually rendered to forbid murder rather than all killing [1] [2]. Context in the Torah, later Jewish law, and Christian interpretation treats the command as a moral limit on individuals while allowing state-sanctioned or wartime killing in specific circumstances [3] [4].
1. The wording and translation problem: “kill” versus “murder”
The single Hebrew verb in Exodus 20:13 has been the source of centuries of translation debate, and many modern scholars and translations favor “You shall not murder” to capture the focus on unlawful killing rather than any taking of life whatsoever; this linguistic point is emphasized in hermeneutical discussions and by commentators who argue “murder” is the correct sense [2] [5]. The older King James phrasing “Thou shalt not kill” amplified confusion because English usage shifted, prompting expositions that stress the command targets unjustified homicide rather than, for example, lawful executions or killing in war [6] [7].
2. Torah context and legal exceptions within the biblical corpus
Reading the command in the broader Mosaic law shows the Bible itself distinguishes kinds of killing: the same scriptural tradition prescribes capital punishment for some crimes, regulates battlefield slaughter, and allows differentiated treatment for accidental killings, which indicates the command functions against unlawful killing rather than an absolute ban on killing any human [1] [4]. Rabbinic interpretation and later legal texts treat shedding innocent blood as a grave communal crime—murder is singled out among the worst sins—further implying the prohibition is oriented toward preserving human life in the community, not limiting its scope to Israelites only in a way that would permit murder of outsiders without moral consequence [3] [8].
3. How Jewish and Christian traditions read the addressee and scope
Judaism frames the Ten Commandments as part of covenantal law given to Israel, shaping community conduct, yet Jewish law’s universalizing instincts in prohibitions against shedding innocent blood indicate moral concern for human life broadly rather than ethnicity-bound protection [3]. Christianity, while acknowledging the command’s Israelite legal setting, has traditionally construed it as a universal moral norm against murder; New Testament teachings (e.g., Jesus’ expansion of the law to internal attitudes) further broaden ethical application beyond narrow tribal membership [9].
4. Practical limits and state authority: who may kill when and why
Both Jewish and Christian expositors note numerous biblical precedents where killing occurs under divine or governmental sanction—capital punishment, just war, or specific divine commands—leading many interpreters to distinguish individual prohibition from state or judicial acts of killing, an interpretive move found across sources that explain why the command does not forbid all killing in practice [6] [3] [10]. This distinction underlies debates across traditions about war, capital punishment, and self-defense: the command prohibits unlawful killing by individuals while communities and governments are depicted as having delegated authority to use lethal force in certain contexts [3] [10].
5. Conclusion and limits of available reporting
Taken together, the reporting and scholarship assembled here show the Sixth Commandment is aimed at forbidding murder—unlawful, unjustified killing—rather than protecting only Jews or Israelite members; the biblical context and later legal-religious interpretation consistently allow for lawful killing under specific circumstances and treat the prohibition as a moral law with broad human applicability [2] [4] [5]. The sources used do not, however, exhaust every scholarly or sectarian nuance—some minority readings or historical uses might frame the command differently—and the materials provided do not include primary ancient Near Eastern legal comparisons that could further sharpen whether the original hearers understood the prohibition as ethnically restricted [1] [3].