What were the official findings about the 2013 Molokai plane crash that killed Loretta Fuddy?
Executive summary
The National Transportation Safety Board’s published findings and subsequent investigative reporting concluded the December 11, 2013 Makani Kai Cessna ditching off Molokai followed a loss of engine power shortly after takeoff and that state Health Director Loretta Fuddy died after exiting the aircraft due to an acute cardiac arrhythmia brought on by hyperventilation while awaiting rescue; investigators also documented lapses in passenger safety briefing and problems with life‑vests that contributed to passengers’ difficulty after the ditching [1] [2] [3] [4]. Parallel technical probes by the FAA and engine manufacturer found evidence of fractured compressor turbine blades and material fatigue in the engine, and the engine maker’s design and inspection practices have been scrutinized in lawsuits arising from the accident [5] [6].
1. The immediate official narrative: engine power loss, water ditching, one fatality
NTSB reporting and contemporaneous news accounts establish that the Makani Kai Cessna Caravan experienced a loss of engine power roughly one to two minutes after departing Kalaupapa, prompting a forced water landing about 3:20–3:30 p.m.; all nine people aboard exited the airplane into choppy ocean waters, eight survived and Loretta Fuddy was the sole fatality [1] [7] [8] [9].
2. Medical cause of death: arrhythmia from hyperventilation, not blunt trauma
The autopsy and NTSB-related reporting concluded Fuddy did not die of traumatic injuries from the ditching but suffered an acute cardiac arrhythmia triggered by hyperventilation while in the water; witnesses reported she became fearful and hyperventilated before losing consciousness, and rescuers later found she was wearing an improperly sized infant life vest that was only partially inflated [1] [2] [4] [3].
3. Safety equipment and procedural failures documented by investigators
Investigators determined the pilot had not given the federally required safety briefing before takeoff, and passengers reported difficulty locating and deploying life vests after the crash; examination of Fuddy’s vest showed it was designed for an infant and had a single CO2 cartridge deployed rather than functioning as an adult flotation device — facts NTSB and local reporting tied directly to the challenges survivors faced while awaiting rescue [3] [1] [7].
4. Mechanical findings: fractured turbine blades, manufacturer scrutiny and litigation
Separate FAA and manufacturer examinations identified that one or more compressor turbine (CT) blades had fractured from fatigue and that certain CT blades were prone to cracking or fracture under high power/high temperature operation due to creep and sulfidation; these technical conclusions fed into litigation by Fuddy’s family and others alleging inspection or design failures by Pratt & Whitney Canada and gaps in borescope inspection regimes [5] [6].
5. Disputes, legal follow‑ups, and the information vacuum that fueled conspiracy claims
The airline’s owner disputed some findings, including the availability of life vests, and the extended length of the investigations plus Fuddy’s high public profile provoked speculation and conspiracy theories following her death; major outlets noted the proliferation of unfounded theories even as NTSB, FAA and autopsy evidence pointed to mechanical failure plus human factors in evacuation and flotation rather than foul play [10] [11] [12].
6. What the official record definitively says — and what remains outside the sources
Official investigative threads converge on a loss of engine power leading to a successful ditching, survivable for eight passengers but culminating in Fuddy’s death from an arrhythmia after she exited into the water while wearing an inadequate infant vest; the FAA/manufacturer findings about fractured CT blades frame a probable mechanical root cause, and the NTSB highlighted procedural lapses like a skipped safety briefing and life‑vest problems [1] [2] [5] [3]. Reporting provided does not permit attribution beyond these documented findings — for example, deeper metallurgical causation pathways, any final consolidated NTSB probable cause statement text, or the full scope of subsequent settlements and court findings are not fully reproduced in the cited materials [5] [6].