Fact check: Can 60% enriched uranium be used in a nuclear reactor?

1. Summary of the results

Based on the analyses provided, 60% enriched uranium cannot be effectively used in nuclear reactors. The sources consistently indicate that this enrichment level serves no practical civilian purpose.

The World Nuclear Association confirms that most commercial nuclear power reactors require uranium enriched to only 3-5% U-235, with some special power reactor fuels using up to 20% enrichment ^[1]. This establishes that 60% enrichment is far beyond what any civilian nuclear reactor requires.

Multiple sources emphasize that 60% enriched uranium has no realistic civilian applications. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) explicitly states that Iran has "no other realistic use for this material" beyond weapons development, suggesting it cannot be used for nuclear reactors ^[2]. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General has confirmed that 60% enrichment is "well beyond what is required for civilian purposes" ^[3].

2. Missing context/alternative viewpoints

The original question lacks crucial context about uranium enrichment levels and their specific applications. The analyses reveal several important missing elements:

• Standard reactor fuel requirements: Commercial nuclear reactors operate with uranium enriched to 3-5% U-235, making 60% enrichment completely unnecessary for power generation ^[1]
• Iran's strategic positioning: Iran's production of 60% enriched uranium at facilities like Fordow represents a significant step toward weapons-grade uranium (90% enrichment), as this level can be "potentially increased to 90% for weapons-grade uranium" ^[4]
• International monitoring concerns: The IAEA has been actively monitoring Iran's 60% enrichment activities, with reports showing "increased production of 60% enriched uranium" that could be "converted into weapon-grade uranium" ^[5]
• Technical pathway implications: While 60% enriched uranium "cannot be used to make a useful nuclear explosive device" directly, it represents a critical intermediate step in the enrichment process toward weapons-grade material ^{[2] [6]}

3. Potential misinformation/bias in the original statement

The original question appears neutral but omits the critical context that makes this question significant from a nuclear proliferation perspective. By asking simply whether 60% enriched uranium "can be used" in reactors, it fails to acknowledge that:

• This enrichment level has no legitimate civilian nuclear power applications ^{[1] [3]}
• The question itself may inadvertently legitimize Iran's 60% enrichment activities by suggesting potential civilian uses
• International nuclear experts and organizations like the IAEA and ISIS (Institute for Science and International Security) view 60% enrichment specifically as a proliferation concern rather than a reactor fuel question ^{[6] [5] [3]}

The framing could benefit those who wish to downplay the weapons implications of 60% enrichment by focusing on theoretical reactor applications that don't exist in practice.