Fact check: Can 60% enriched uranium be diluted to 3.5% for light water reactor use?

1. Summary of the results

Based on the analyses provided, yes, 60% enriched uranium can theoretically be diluted to 3.5% for light water reactor use, though the sources don't explicitly detail the dilution process itself. The technical foundation for this conclusion comes from several key facts:

• Commercial nuclear reactors typically require uranium enriched to 3-5% U-235 for operation ^{[1] [2]}
• Natural uranium contains only 0.7% U-235 and must be enriched from this baseline to the 3-5% range for most reactors ^[2]
• Uranium enrichment is a scalable process that can increase or decrease U-235 concentrations through established methods like centrifuge technology ^{[1] [2]}

The analyses confirm that 60% enriched uranium represents a significant escalation in enrichment operations and is much closer to weapons-grade material (90% enrichment) than reactor fuel ^[3]. However, the step from 60% to weapons-grade is relatively short, making this level of enrichment particularly concerning from a proliferation standpoint ^[3].

2. Missing context/alternative viewpoints

The original question lacks several crucial contextual elements that the analyses reveal:

• Economic and practical considerations: While technically possible, diluting 60% enriched uranium to 3.5% would be economically wasteful since significant resources were invested in achieving the higher enrichment level ^[1]
• Proliferation concerns: The analyses emphasize that 60% enriched uranium cannot be used to make a useful nuclear explosive device, but represents a dangerous step toward weapons capability ^[3]. This context is critical when discussing such highly enriched material.
• Alternative applications: The sources mention High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) and its applications in advanced reactors and small modular reactors ^[4], suggesting there may be more appropriate uses for higher-enriched uranium than dilution.
• Political implications: Iran's decision to enrich to 60% was intended to send a political message rather than to produce weapons-grade uranium ^[3], indicating that discussions of 60% enriched uranium often carry geopolitical significance beyond technical considerations.
• Infrastructure requirements: The analyses note that uranium enrichment requires significant technical capabilities and infrastructure ^[1], context that's absent from the simple technical question posed.

3. Potential misinformation/bias in the original statement

The original question, while technically straightforward, presents the dilution process as a neutral technical inquiry without acknowledging the significant proliferation risks associated with 60% enriched uranium. This framing could be misleading because:

• It normalizes the possession of near-weapons-grade material by treating it as simply another feedstock for civilian nuclear fuel
• It omits the security and regulatory frameworks that govern such highly enriched uranium, as discussed in the context of LEU banking and storage ^[5]
• The question ignores the economic irrationality of enriching uranium to 60% only to dilute it back down, which could suggest either a lack of understanding of the enrichment process or an attempt to legitimize possession of highly enriched uranium

The analyses consistently emphasize that uranium enrichment levels are closely monitored due to proliferation concerns ^{[6] [3]}, a critical context that the original question entirely sidesteps.