What are current global systems and policies for forecasting and mitigating severe space weather?

Checked on January 23, 2026
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Executive summary

A patchwork of national agencies, dedicated forecasting centers, coordinating bodies, and laws now underpins global space‑weather forecasting and mitigation, but capabilities remain uneven and dependent on aging sensors and cross‑sector coordination. U.S. federal law and strategy—bolstered by the PROSWIFT Act and the National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan—illustrate a concerted, resource‑focused approach that is mirrored by national centers in allies such as the U.K. and by the European Space Agency, while scientific reviews and operational audits warn of persistent gaps in observations, models, and infrastructure protection [1] [2] [3] [4] [5].

1. Global forecasting architecture: a network of national forecasters and shared data

Operational forecasting is dominated by a small number of national centers that issue continuous warnings and products for governments, industry and the public—NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) in the U.S. and the Met Office Space Weather Operations Centre in the U.K. are explicit examples of 24/7 national forecasters that provide guidance to infrastructure operators [6] [4]. European and other national providers, and ESA’s Space Weather Office, supply complementary alerts and technical services while encouraging owners and operators of spaceborne and ground infrastructure to act on warnings [3].

2. U.S. policy and law: codifying roles, funding, and coordination

U.S. roles and responsibilities are codified in legislation and interagency plans that assign forecasting, observation, and mitigation duties across NOAA, NASA, NSF, DOD, DHS, DOE and OSTP; the PROSWIFT Act of 2020 and subsequent National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan formalized coordination to “prepare for, avoid, mitigate, respond to, and recover from” impacts and directed agencies to improve forecasting and resilience [7] [1] [2] [8]. Federal documents identify DHS as a warnings disseminator, DOE as the coordinator for electric‑grid recovery, and State for international engagement, signaling an all‑of‑government approach to operational response [7].

3. Observations and sensors: dependence on a handful of platforms and imminent upgrades

Forecast skill depends on spacecraft and ground sensors that measure the solar wind, coronagraphs, and magnetometers; operational forecasters rely on platforms such as DSCOVR and SOHO for solar wind and CME imagery, and NOAA is replacing aging assets with the SWFO‑L1 mission to improve lead times and operational coronagraph data [9] [6]. Scientific and agency reports repeatedly call for expanded in‑space observations and modernized sensor protections—including spectrum safeguards and global coordination of sensors—to close observational gaps that limit forecast accuracy [10] [11].

4. Mitigation tools: sector playbooks, benchmarks, and infrastructure hardening

Mitigation sits at the intersection of forecast delivery and sector action: agencies develop benchmarks, industry guidance, and contingency procedures so grid operators, satellite operators, aviation and communications services can take protective steps when alerted, and CISA and DOE roles emphasize resilience and recovery planning for critical infrastructure [12] [2] [7]. White House implementation guidance and SWORM subcommittee activity reflect efforts to translate forecasts into standardized response procedures, testing, and technology deployment [13] [8].

5. International cooperation and divergence: common goals, uneven capacity

There is broad international recognition that space weather is a global risk requiring shared observations, modeling and standards—science articles and national strategies call for expanded international programs—but capacities differ, with wealthier nations fielding operational centers and missions while others rely on shared products and recommendations [14] [4] [3]. ESA and national met services emphasize timely operator notifications and resilience, yet implementation at industry scale depends on domestic regulation, incentives, and investment levels not uniformly present worldwide [3] [4].

6. Gaps, debates and hidden agendas: forecasting limits, funding battles and commercial interests

Scientific reviews and federal audits underline persistent limits in physics understanding, model accuracy, and mesoscale forecasting that constrain reliable, long‑lead operational predictions; analysts call for more in‑space measurements and more funding while noting that commercial vendors, national security concerns and infrastructure owners have competing priorities that can skew investment and data‑sharing choices [5] [14] [10]. Policy documents push for public–private partnerships and standards, but debates persist over which investments most efficiently reduce societal risk and how to prioritize sensor protection, spectrum allocation, and international commitments [11] [10].

7. Bottom line: improving but incomplete preparedness

Forecasting and mitigation systems today combine credible national centers, codified U.S. interagency roles, improving spacecraft plans and international cooperation, yet they remain constrained by limited observations, modeling gaps, and uneven global implementation—progress is real and policy attention has increased, but scientific and infrastructure vulnerabilities continue to require prioritized funding, international coordination, and operational drills to convert forecasts into resilient outcomes [1] [2] [11] [14].

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