Is nz second place on long term survival in a full scale nuclear war
This fact-check may be outdated. Consider refreshing it to get the most current information.
Executive summary
A peer‑reviewed risk analysis comparing 38 island nations ranks Australia first and New Zealand a close second for capacity to survive a sunlight‑reducing catastrophe such as a large‑scale nuclear war, primarily on the basis of domestic food production and social resilience [1] [2] [3]. That ranking, however, reflects a narrow set of metrics (mainly agricultural output and isolation) and does not mean New Zealand would be safe or emerge unscathed from a full‑scale nuclear exchange; significant caveats about imports, fuel, infrastructure and model uncertainty temper the “second place” claim [4] [5] [6].
1. The study behind the headline: why NZ scores near the top
Researchers published in Risk Analysis evaluated 38 island countries across factors intended to predict post‑apocalyptic survival, and they identified Australia, followed by New Zealand, Iceland, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu as the most capable of producing enough food under nuclear‑winter‑style sunlight reductions [1] [2] [3]. The core reason New Zealand ranks highly is its agricultural capacity and distance from likely northern‑hemisphere targets — models showed even a severe scenario (a ~61% crop reduction) could still leave New Zealand with sufficient domestic calories in some simulations [1] [2].
2. What “second place” actually measures — and what it omits
The ranking is primarily about capacity for domestic food production under abrupt global cooling and incorporates social‑cohesion and health security metrics, not a full multidimensional assessment of survival after nuclear war [1] [4]. It does not fully capture dependencies that could undermine recovery: researchers and New Zealand institutions warn that growing dependence on imported diesel, digital systems and international trade weakens resilience and could precipitate cascading societal failures despite local food surpluses [4] [5].
3. Targeting risk and geopolitical nuance
Some coverage flags that Australia’s close military ties with major nuclear powers could make it more of a target despite its material advantages, and New Zealand’s longstanding nuclear‑free policy is cited as a relative advantage in reducing direct targeting risk — but these are probabilistic, not guaranteed, assessments [1] [3]. Media and pundit pieces extend the study into deterministic claims that Australia and New Zealand would be “last places standing,” a leap beyond the study’s conditional food‑security focus [7] [8].
4. The darker statistical counterpoints: large projected mortalities and uncertainty
Other authoritative commentators and synthesis work underline that even relatively “well placed” countries could suffer huge losses; for instance, summaries of broader nuclear‑winter literature and recent popular syntheses present grim mortality estimates for New Zealand under prolonged nuclear winter scenarios — figures such as very large fractions of the population dying over two years appear in some analyses, underscoring model variability and severe risk even for island refuges [6]. Independent policy briefs also describe New Zealand as “relatively well placed” but warn about global food shocks and two‑billion‑plus casualties in some scenarios, demonstrating the global interconnectedness of outcomes [9].
5. Bottom line: qualified “yes” — with heavy caveats
On the narrow question of whether New Zealand ranks second for long‑term survival in a full‑scale nuclear war, available peer‑reviewed research and widespread reporting consistently place New Zealand near the top of island‑nation rankings — commonly second to Australia — when survival is defined largely by local food production and isolation [1] [2] [3]. Yet that “second place” is conditional and limited: it does not guarantee safety, ignores dependency‑driven cascading failures (diesel, digital, trade), and coexists with analyses showing very high potential mortality and profound uncertainty about complex systemic breakdowns [4] [5] [6]. Policymakers and the public should therefore treat the ranking as a useful but partial indicator, not a promise of safety.