How much of U.S. civilian nuclear fuel comes from Russian-origin uranium in 2025?
Executive summary
Roughly one quarter of the enriched uranium that fuels U.S. civilian reactors in 2025 traces back to Russian-origin supplies, with most authoritative estimates centering near 25–27 percent [1] [2]. That figure is not static: it reflects long-term commercial contracts, recent U.S. legislation banning Russian imports (with waivers) and contested Russian export actions, so delivered shares in 2025 vary by dataset and company waivers [3] [4] [1] [5].
1. What “Russian-origin uranium” means in practice
“Russian-origin” encompasses uranium products (yellowcake/U3O8), conversion and, especially, enrichment services provided by Russian state firms such as TENEX/Rosatom; enriched uranium (LEU) is the stage most relevant to reactor fuel and is where Russian firms historically held major market share supplying U.S. utilities [3] [2]. The U.S. fuel chain is highly interdependent and often mixes materials from multiple producers, so attribution can be contractual (what was purchased from a Russian entity) rather than purely physical (atoms from a single mine) [3].
2. The baseline share: about a quarter of U.S. demand
Multiple industry and policy sources converge on the mid‑20s level for Russia’s share of U.S. enriched uranium demand: Centrus and industry analysts have described Russian-origin LEU as accounting for roughly 25–27 percent of U.S. fuel needs in recent years [1] [2]. Independent trackers and analysts cited by Foreign Policy and mining trade press likewise place Russian-origin supplies at “more than a quarter” of U.S. enriched fuel requirements before the policy disruptions of 2024–25 [6] [7].
3. Legal ban, waivers, and supply in 2025 — nuance that changes the delivered number
Congress passed and the president signed a law banning Russian uranium imports effective August 2024, but the statute includes a waiver program that permits U.S. firms to bring Russian-produced LEU into the market through approved exemptions until January 1, 2028, meaning legally sanctioned Russian-origin deliveries still occurred in 2025 under waivers [4] [3]. Centrus in particular obtained a waiver allowing it to import Russian LEU for deliveries scheduled through 2025 and has applied for extensions, which pulls the near‑term delivered share toward the pre-ban contractual proportions [1] [8].
4. Russia’s countermeasures and conflicting signals
Russia’s government reportedly imposed temporary export limitations in mid‑November 2024 that were described by several outlets as curbing shipments to the U.S. through end‑2025, though accounts vary and some reporting questions whether observed delivery gaps were due to policy or market timing [5] [9]. Rosatom officials continue to claim that Russia remains able and, in some instances, willing to supply the U.S., undercutting a simple narrative of a hard stop to flows [10].
5. Market dynamics: imports, substitutions and falling shares
Even before the 2024 law the U.S. was heavily import‑dependent for upstream uranium and enrichment services — with imports accounting for about 99% of U3O8 use in 2023 and foreign enrichment covering a large share of LEU needs — and industry data show U.S. purchases from Russia fell in the wake of the ban, perhaps by roughly half for enriched uranium in the first year, though that decline did not eliminate Russian contribution in 2025 because of waivers and existing deliveries [3] [6]. Allies and commercial suppliers (Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Urenco, Cameco, Orano) are stepping up but cannot instantaneously replace all Russian enrichment capacity [3] [7] [8].
6. What can’t be known precisely from available reporting
Public reporting provides consistent ballpark figures (~25%) and documents the legal and commercial mechanisms that kept some Russian-origin uranium flowing in 2025 [1] [4] [2], but discrepancies in trade data, proprietary contract confidentiality, and conflicting press claims about Russian export bans mean an exact delivered percentage for calendar‑year 2025 cannot be definitively stated from the cited sources alone; estimates must therefore be read as best‑available approximations rather than precise audit‑level tallies [5] [9].
7. Bottom line and implications
The best evidence from government, industry and policy reporting indicates that roughly one quarter of U.S. civilian reactor fuel in 2025 was of Russian origin — a share moderated in practice by U.S. import ban waivers and by short‑term shifts in procurement — and that policy and industrial efforts are underway to reduce that exposure over the coming years even as short‑term contractual and market realities keep some Russian LEU in U.S. fuel mixes [1] [4] [11].