What portion of reported 2025 civilian killings in Nigeria are attributed specifically to Boko Haram versus ISWAP in incident-level datasets?
Executive summary
Available incident-level reporting and monitoring sources do not provide a single, authoritative percentage split of 2025 civilian killings in Nigeria that can be cleanly attributed to Boko Haram versus ISWAP; datasets and reporting instead show both groups active in deadly operations across the northeast, with different targeting patterns and uneven attribution practices across monitors [1] [2] [3]. Where counts exist they are either for different timeframes, specific target types, or combine the two groups, so any numeric “portion” for 2025 cannot be stated from the material provided without risking misrepresentation [4] [5].
1. The question being asked and why available sources fall short
The user seeks an incident-level attribution: of all civilian killings reported in Nigeria in 2025, what fraction were specifically carried out by Boko Haram versus ISWAP; that requires datasets that (a) record civilian fatalities by incident and (b) reliably assign responsibility to one group or the other. The sources provided include national tallies and human-rights reporting that aggregate insurgent fatalities [1] [3], thematic regional analyses that combine Boko Haram and ISWAP under “militant Islamist” totals [4], and incident compilations with different scopes (e.g., targeting-Christians subset) that show ISWAP and Boko Haram tallies for certain categories and periods—but none supplies a comprehensive, incident-level split for all reported civilian killings in 2025 [5] [2].
2. What the data and reporting do show about 2025 patterns
Human Rights Watch and other monitors document major massacres and clashes in 2025 where responsibility is assigned on a case-by-case basis—for example the Mafa massacre and other high-casualty events linked to ISWAP or suspected Boko Haram, and heavy fighting in Borno that produced hundreds of reported fatalities [3] [2]. National reporting cited by the Global Centre notes at least 2,266 people killed by bandits or insurgents in the first half of 2025—an aggregate that mixes categories of perpetrators and does not separate Boko Haram from ISWAP in that headline figure [1]. ACSS/region-overview materials treat the Lake Chad Basin deaths as largely driven by Boko Haram/ISWAP collectively but report combined fatalities rather than an internal split [4].
3. Where some incident-level breakdowns exist—context and limits
Certain incident databases and analytic snapshots yield partial comparisons: one compilation focused on incidents targeting Christians (GTTAC data quoted in reporting) lists far more Fulani-perpetrated incidents and shows ISWAP recorded in 24 incidents versus Boko Haram in 8 for the 2019–mid‑2025 window, but that dataset is narrowly scoped (target type) and not representative of all civilian fatalities in 2025 [5]. ACLED provides incident-level data on Nigeria but the snippeted material here does not include a ready 2025 civilian-fatality split between the two groups; ACLED reporting instead documents heavy fighting and many fatalities in Borno and other hot spots without a single-group percentage in the excerpts provided [2] [6].
4. Why attribution is inherently difficult and what that implies for any numeric claim
Attribution between Boko Haram and ISWAP is complicated because the groups splintered, reconfigured and sometimes cooperate or compete, and because field reporting often arrives with ambiguity—witnesses, authorities and monitors may disagree, and some data sources combine the two under “militant Islamist” or “insurgent” labels [7] [8] [4]. Monitoring organizations therefore differ in methodology and scope: some aggregate fatalities by region or campaign, some attribute by claim of responsibility, others rely on eyewitness or military attribution; the sources provided show these methodological divergences rather than a single reconciled incident-level decomposition for 2025 [5] [4].
5. Bottom line for readers seeking a percent split
From the documents available here it is not possible to state a defensible, dataset-backed percentage of 2025 civilian killings in Nigeria attributable specifically to Boko Haram versus ISWAP—most high-level tallies aggregate the two, and incident-level breakdowns that do exist are partial or target-specific [1] [4] [5]. The responsible reporting approach is to treat Boko Haram and ISWAP as jointly responsible for much of the Lake Chad Basin violence in 2025 while noting that published incident datasets and media snapshots in this collection do not provide the precise, incident-level split requested [4] [2] [3].