What specific hybrid threats does Eurasia Group identify that could target Canada, and how is Ottawa preparing?
Executive summary
Eurasia Group warns Canada faces targeted “Russian hybrid attacks” as part of a broader shift from kinetic fronts in Europe to hybrid warfare aimed at eroding allied resolve, and it also flags economic and geopolitical pressure stemming from U.S. instability that will leave Ottawa exposed [1] [2] [3]. Reporting shows Ottawa is being urged to rebalance ties, diversify trade partners and play “defence and offence” diplomatically and economically, but the public summaries reviewed provide only high-level prescriptions rather than a detailed Canadian contingency plan [1] [4].
1. What Eurasia Group calls the specific hybrid threats to Canada
Eurasia Group’s Top Risks frames “Russia’s second front” as a shift toward hybrid war—meaning a campaign that uses information operations, cyber harassment, proxy attacks and political pressure rather than just conventional armies—to erode NATO support for Ukraine and punish supporters like Canada; the report explicitly warns this exposure will include “Russian hybrid attacks” that could target Canadian forces and institutions [3] [1] [5]. The firm also situates Canada’s vulnerability in the context of other non-kinetic levers: economic coercion from an unstable U.S. (tariffs and a “Zombie USMCA” that keeps North American trade uncertain), competition in the Arctic as melting ice opens strategic routes and mineral access, and the weaponization of resources like water in great-power rivalry—each of which Eurasia Group argues can be used as hybrid pressure on Ottawa [3] [2] [4].
2. How Eurasia Group links U.S. turmoil to hybrid exposure
Eurasia Group’s dominant theme for 2026 is a U.S. “political revolution” that it says will upend the global order and leave Canada uniquely affected because of deep economic, security and geographic ties; that U.S. disruption, in Eurasia’s view, both magnifies Russia’s incentive to engage in hybrid tactics and limits Canada’s diplomatic space to respond, increasing Ottawa’s exposure to coercive measures short of open war [6] [1] [4].
3. What Ottawa is reportedly doing, and what the sources actually document
The reporting and Eurasia Group’s Canada addendum portray Ottawa’s posture as two-fold: prioritize deeper ties with non-U.S. NATO allies and simultaneously diversify trade and strategic partnerships so Canada can “play defence and offence” amid an unreliable American partner [1] [4]. The material notes Prime Minister Mark Carney’s emphasis on the moment of decision and references efforts to strengthen European ties and manage Arctic competition, but it does not provide a granular, publicly documented emergency response plan or specific new military or cyber-defence programs for Canada in the excerpts reviewed [1] [7].
4. Evidence gaps, alternative views and potential conflicts of interest
The publicly quoted coverage repeatedly cites Eurasia Group’s assessment but contains limited detail on the precise hybrid modalities (e.g., which cyber capabilities, disinformation vectors or targeting profiles would be used against Canada) and little on concrete Canadian countermeasures; journalists and readers should note that reporting also flags proximity between the consultancy and Canadian political figures—Diana Fox Carney’s affiliation with Eurasia Group and prior links between the firm and public officials—information that could affect perceptions of influence or framing [5]. Alternative perspectives—such as Canadian officials’ own threat assessments or defence planners’ statements—are not present in the cited excerpts, so the analysis must refrain from claiming Ottawa has implemented the specific measures Eurasia Group recommends [5] [7].
5. What this means for policymakers and the public
Taken together, Eurasia Group’s message is clear: expect hybrid operations aimed at political erosion, economic pain and strategic disruption rather than a single battlefield assault, and recognize the urgency of diversifying diplomatic and economic ties while shoring up non-kinetic defences; however, the public reporting available here documents policy direction and strategic advice more than an operationalized Canadian response, leaving important unanswered questions about capability upgrades, readiness timelines and specific counter-hybrid doctrines [1] [3] [4].