What do recent FBI and DHS threat assessments say about Islamist extremist activity in the US in 2023-2025?

Executive Summary — Clear Picture, Competing Trends

The FBI and DHS assessments from 2023–2025 depict a persistent but evolving Islamist extremist threat to the United States driven by both foreign terrorist organizations and homegrown actors, while also emphasizing that other forms of domestic violent extremism remain prominent. Federal reports describe sustained intent from groups like ISIS and al‑Qa‘ida to inspire or direct attacks, note lone‑actor and small‑cell vulnerability within US communities, and place Islamist risks within a broader, crowded threat environment that includes far‑right and other domestic violent extremists ^{[1] [2] [3]}. Analysts outside government diverge on scale and trend: some track an uptick in incidents in 2024 and early 2025, while academic reviews characterize jihadist violence in the US as low relative to past peaks. This assessment synthesizes those viewpoints to show a manageable but non‑negligible Islamist extremist threat that requires continued counterterrorism attention alongside robust civil‑liberties protections ^{[2] [4] [5]}.

1. Why Washington says the threat remains alive — foreign groups still seek influence

DHS and FBI materials repeatedly state that foreign terrorist organizations retain intent and capability to inspire or enable attacks against the United States, even after the territorial defeats of ISIS. The Homeland Threat Assessments (2024 and 2025) emphasize that al‑Qa‘ida and ISIS continue to rebuild overseas and sustain transnational networks that can radicalize or direct sympathizers in the US, and that international conflicts can amplify messaging that incites violence domestically ^{[1] [2]}. Those federal reports underscore the specific dynamic in which international extremist narratives and local grievances converge: US‑based individuals can be inspired remotely, act with little warning, and exploit readily available weapons. DHS and FBI therefore frame Islamist extremism as part of a global system of threat vectors requiring sustained intelligence, international cooperation, and domestic vigilance, not a temporarily dormant risk ^{[1] [2]}.

2. What the FBI’s domestic focus adds — lone actors and hybrid motives

FBI domestic terrorism assessments from 2023 and related strategic analyses highlight the predominance of lone offenders or small groups motivated by mixed ideologies, including Islamist sympathies among a broader set of grievances. The FBI’s 2023 strategic intelligence assessment and subsequent domestic‑terrorism summaries point to a landscape where online radicalization, personal grievances, and hybrid conspiratorial narratives can push an individual toward violence without formal direction from a foreign group ^{[3] [6]}. The agencies stress protecting civil liberties while expanding tools to detect and disrupt plots, reflecting concern that monitoring must be targeted and constitutional. This federal framing signals that Islamist‑linked violence in the US is often decentralized, blending ideological and personal drivers, and demanding both community‑based prevention and traditional counterterrorism methods ^{[3] [6]}.

3. Outside trackers see an increase in incidents in 2024 — ADL’s contrary signal

Non‑governmental analyses register a noticeable rise in Islamist‑linked incidents in 2024, particularly according to the ADL Center on Extremism, which documented seven Islamist terror incidents and two actual attacks that year, citing motivations tied to ISIS support and reactions to Middle East conflicts ^[4]. ADL’s dataset contrasts with government language that emphasizes enduring intent rather than a sharp resurgence; it flags operational successes and near‑miss plots that government reports treat as part of an evolving but steady threat posture. ADL researchers also note that, even amid an uptick in Islamist incidents, far‑right extremism continued to account for considerable violence, underscoring the multidimensional nature of the domestic threat environment and the need to avoid singular focus on one ideology ^[4].

4. Academic perspective: low baseline but caution after notable attacks

Academic analysis from CSIS and other studies argues that jihadist terrorism in the US remains low compared with past peaks, with a small average of plots and diminished lethality since ISIS’s territorial defeat in 2019, suggesting that the phenomenon does not currently indicate a broad resurgence ^[5]. These scholars note that most US‑based jihadists act with minimal organizational direction and that the threat is largely inspirational rather than centrally orchestrated. At the same time, analysts caution that isolated high‑casualty attacks — like the New Orleans vehicular attack cited by several observers — can alter public risk perception and require recalibrated resources and community engagement despite low aggregate incident rates ^{[5] [4]}.

5. The bottom line: layered risk, competing urgency, and what’s missing

Across federal assessments, NGO tracking, and academic reviews, the consensus is layered: Islamist extremist activity remains a tangible risk, but not the singular dominant threat, and its profile is shaped by global events, homegrown radicalization processes, and the persistence of other violent ideologies. Government assessments emphasize intent, capability, and prevention within constitutional bounds; NGOs document recent operational upticks; academics place recent incidents in a longer downward trend since the mid‑2010s ^{[1] [4] [5]}. Key omissions across sources include granular, publicly releasable metrics on disrupted plots and fusion between local policing and federal counterterror work, making it harder for outside observers to quantify near‑term trajectory. Continued transparency about trends, while respecting investigative integrity and civil liberties, would improve public understanding and policy calibration ^{[3] [6]}.