Fact check: What roles do Fulani herder–farmer conflicts and Boko Haram/ISWAP play in attacks on Christian communities in 2024–2025?

1. What people are actually claiming — competing narratives that shape the debate

Multiple claims circulate about violence against Christians in Nigeria: one set describes systematic, religion-targeted mass murder constituting religious persecution; another frames the violence as localized, resource-competition and criminality tied to Fulani herder–farmer disputes in the Middle Belt; a third highlights Islamist insurgents (Boko Haram/ISWAP) conducting deliberate attacks on Christian villages in the Northeast. Congressional testimony and commentary have emphasized Fulani attacks in the Middle Belt and accused the government of failing to protect Christians ^{[1] [4]}. Separately, insurgent groups have publicly claimed responsibility for operations that killed security personnel and civilians, sometimes releasing visual evidence through their media channels, underscoring a different pattern of organized, ideological violence ^[2]. Each narrative attracts distinct political and humanitarian agendas.

2. How Fulani herder–farmer conflicts drive community-level violence

The Middle Belt’s violence is driven primarily by competition over land, grazing rights, and climate-driven movement, with ethnic and religious identities intertwined. Reports and congressional testimony in 2025 highlight Fulani attacks on farming communities, often in mixed-ethnicity areas where pastoralist routes and expanding agriculture collide ^{[1] [3]}. These clashes frequently result in targeted killings of villagers, destruction of farms, and retaliatory cycles; victims include Christians but also Muslim farmers, complicating simple religious explanations. Analysts note the pattern is more consistent with communal conflict and criminality over resources than an ideologically driven campaign of religious extermination ^[5]. Still, communal divisions and weak state protection magnify the impact on Christian-majority villages, producing narratives of systematic persecution that fuel domestic and international political responses ^[4].

3. What Boko Haram/ISWAP have done in 2024–2025 — insurgent methods and targets

In the Northeast and Lake Chad basin, Boko Haram and ISWAP continued an operational resurgence in 2024–2025, conducting attacks on military installations, convoys, and civilian settlements. ISWAP claimed responsibility for operations that explicitly targeted both security forces and Christian communities in Borno and Adamawa, sometimes using propaganda channels to disseminate images and statements ^[2]. Analytical reporting documents a tactical evolution: drones, surveillance, and AI-enhanced reconnaissance have amplified their reach, and intra-jihadist competition with JAS has reshaped targeting and brutality ^{[6] [7]}. These groups’ stated ideological goals and explicit targeting of civilians on religious lines in some attacks distinguish their actions from resource conflicts in the Middle Belt, even as both create atrocity risks for Christian populations ^[8].

4. Geography, timing and why the two phenomena shouldn’t be conflated

The spatial and temporal patterns separate the two phenomena: Fulani herder–farmer violence is concentrated in the Middle Belt and is chronic, linked to land-use changes and seasonal movements; Boko Haram/ISWAP violence is concentrated in Borno, Adamawa, and neighboring Lake Chad regions and follows insurgent campaigns and tactical shifts that intensified in 2024–2025 ^{[1] [6]}. Mixing them obscures local drivers and policy prescriptions: counterinsurgency, humanitarian relief, and deradicalization address the insurgent threat, while land reform, grazing policies, and local conflict mediation are central to reducing herder–farmer violence. International and domestic actors who conflate the two risk misallocating resources and oversimplifying accountability for atrocities ^[3].

5. Humanitarian fallout and overlap — why civilians, including Christians, bear the brunt

Regardless of perpetrator, civilians face displacement, food insecurity, and protection gaps. ISWAP/Boko Haram operations exacerbate humanitarian collapse in the Northeast, producing acute malnutrition and health-system breakdowns; Fulani–farmer cycles drive localized displacement and impede planting seasons, deepening food insecurity in the Middle Belt ^{[6] [3]}. In some areas, overlaps occur: displaced Christians from the Middle Belt may transit zones affected by jihadist activity, and criminal actors exploit governance vacuums created by both phenomena. International reporting and briefings emphasize atrocity risk across both contexts, but the pathways to prevention differ, demanding tailored security, governance, and humanitarian responses rather than one-size-fits-all claims of single-source genocide ^{[3] [2]}.

6. Politics, claims of mass murder, and the evidence standards policymakers should use

Political actors have used reports of Christian deaths to push diplomatic designations and policy shifts; for instance, Senate-level advocacy framed the violence as mass murder prompting calls for formal designations ^[4]. Advocacy often foregrounds religious identity to mobilize constituencies, while some analysts stress the centrality of land conflict and criminal violence. Evaluating claims requires distinguishing intentional, ideologically driven attacks from communally rooted resource violence, corroborating perpetrators’ identities, and assessing patterns over time. The evidence in 2024–2025 shows both processes at work: Boko Haram/ISWAP executed explicit attacks in the Northeast that included Christian victims, while Fulani herder–farmer clashes in the Middle Belt produced widespread killings that disproportionately affected farming communities, including Christians, but were rooted in resource competition ^{[2] [1] [8]}.