How has Homeland Security Investigations been used at previous Olympic Games and what lessons were documented?

1. How HSI has actually been used at past Games: support, vetting, and transnational investigations

ICE/HSI deployments to Olympics have been described by officials as supportive and investigative rather than sovereign law‑enforcement operations abroad: past and recent reporting notes HSI officers working with U.S. Diplomatic Security and host‑nation partners to vet personnel and mitigate risks from transnational criminal organizations, and to lend expertise on trafficking and cross‑border crime—roles consistent with HSI’s overseas presence in embassies and international partnerships ^{[2] [1] [9]}.

2. Command structure and the NSSE model: who leads and what that implies

Since the designation of the Salt Lake City Games as a National Special Security Event in 2002, Olympic security in the U.S. has been organized under an NSSE framework with a lead federal agency (historically the Secret Service for Salt Lake), coordinated federal roles for the FBI and FEMA, and creation of Olympic Joint Terrorism Task Forces—an architecture that channels specialized federal support like HSI into broader, multi‑agency command relationships rather than unilateral foreign operations ^{[3] [10]}.

3. Documented operational lessons: coordination, credentialing, and early joint command

Senate and committee hearings and after‑action reports from Salt Lake and earlier Games repeatedly stress that early establishment of a joint task force and a commanding officer onsite are essential, and that thorough background checks and credentialing (tens of thousands screened in 2002) materially reduce insider risks and unwanted access to sensitive sites such as the Olympic Village ^{[5] [4] [10]}.

4. Internal threats and organizational discipline: remove the problem people quickly

Analyses of multiple Games warn that failures often stem from organizational breakdowns and insiders; a security planner from Sydney and subsequent reviewers concluded that “the real terrorists” can be inside organizations and that, where possible, mechanisms must exist to rapidly remove problematic personnel—an oft‑repeated but difficult lesson for complex, multi‑agency events ^[6].

5. New domains: cyber, unmanned aircraft, and after‑action uptake challenges

More recent documented lessons expand beyond traditional counterterrorism: Paris 2024 highlighted dramatic increases in cyberattacks, and organizers and Congressional task forces have flagged drones and UAS as escalating threats—problems that require cross‑sector technical capabilities and legal authorities that past physical‑security models did not contemplate ^{[8] [7]}. After‑action reports historically suffer poor institutional uptake, meaning lessons are recorded but not always institutionalized across successive host cities ^[6].

6. Political and reputational risks when HSI is visible overseas

Deployments of HSI officers to international Games carry political risk: recent 2026 reporting shows Italian officials and local leaders reacting strongly to HSI presence, reflecting domestic controversies over ICE’s domestic enforcement profile even as federal spokespeople emphasize non‑enforcement, advisory roles abroad ^{[11] [12] [1] [2]}. That reaction underscores an implicit agenda tension—host nations must balance accepting U.S technical support against political optics tied to ICE’s domestic actions ^[1].

7. What the documentary record supports and where it is thin

The public record from U.S. hearings, after‑action reports, think‑tank analysis and recent media coverage consistently supports HSI’s pattern as a specialized, supportive player in Olympic security and reaffirms the recurring lessons listed above; however, granular operational details of HSI’s on‑the‑ground activities at specific past Games—what investigators did day‑to‑day and how host authorities integrated those actions—are not fully disclosed in these sources, limiting assessment of tactical effectiveness ^{[5] [1] [2] [6]}.