Alongside arms trafficking, how prevalent are the illicit trade of body armour and other military equipments?
Executive summary
Illicit trade in body armour and military equipment is a persistent, global problem that accompanies arms trafficking: prosecutions show fake or smuggled body armour sold to police in the U.S. (case charging an Ohio man for importing Chinese-made vests and selling them as U.S.-made) [1], while reporting from conflicts and bases documents stolen helmets, plates, optics, generators and medical gear moving through black markets in places like Afghanistan and beyond [2] [3]. Market research shows legal demand and production of body armour is growing—global market estimates for 2024–2025 range from roughly USD 2.4–7.6 billion depending on source—which creates both legitimate supply chains and opportunities for diversion [4] [5] [6].
1. Illicit trade is not limited to guns — body armour and kit move too
Court actions in the United States demonstrate illicit trade in protective equipment: federal prosecutors charged an Ohio man with smuggling body armour from China and selling it to law‑enforcement customers as U.S.-made, including falsified certification labels [1]. Historical and reporting evidence from conflict zones shows a long-standing market for military gear beyond weapons — helmets, body armour plates, optics, and generators appear in black‑market outlets [3] [2].
2. Conflict zones and logistical breakdowns seed second‑hand markets
Journalistic and investigative accounts tie the proliferation of military kit to looting, convoy attacks and weak controls during deployments: NATO and U.S. equipment captured or left vulnerable has surfaced in regional markets [2] [7]. Reported thefts and insider schemes at U.S. bases have led to truckloads of parts and equipment being sold domestically and abroad, showing how institutional failures create supply for illicit buyers [3].
3. Scale is contested — claims exist, solid aggregate numbers scarce
Some commentators and state actors make large estimates of diversion (for example, a cited Russian estimate of huge monthly turnover), but systematic, transparent global tallies for illicit trade in body armour and non‑weapon military kit are not present in the provided reporting; available sources do not give a verified global dollar total for these flows [8]. The New York Times and others describe “a handful” of documented trafficking cases for high‑end systems, suggesting large‑scale leaks are possible but not uniformly evidenced in open reporting [9].
4. A booming legitimate market increases both demand and risk
Market research firms report steady, sometimes sharply different, growth projections for legal body armour markets—examples include market sizes of roughly USD 2.38 billion in 2024 with forecasts to USD 4.16 billion by 2033 [4], and much larger estimates in other datasets [5] [6]. High and rising lawful demand from militaries, police and civilians expands production and distribution channels, which creates more points where diversion, counterfeit products, or illicit exports can occur [4] [10].
5. Types of illicit behaviour documented: smuggling, counterfeit, theft, resale
Cases in the sources include importation and resale of foreign‑made body armour labeled as domestically certified (counterfeit/manipulated labeling) [1], organized theft and sale of U.S. Army parts and equipment by service members and civilians [3], and market sales of looted military kit in regional bazaars [2] [7]. These represent distinct criminal modalities with different enforcement and policy responses [1] [3].
6. Policy responses and competing narratives — transparency matters
States and international instruments aim to curb illicit conventional arms transfers (e.g., the Arms Trade Treaty sets standards to prevent diversion), but the ATT and similar controls focus primarily on weapons; auxiliary equipment and certification fraud often fall into trade law, customs enforcement and criminal prosecution [11]. At the same time, narratives about weapons and equipment “flooding” black markets are politically charged; some accounts denying large‑scale diversion emphasize tracking and auditing systems for aid deliveries while critics and adversarial states highlight seizures and isolated scandals to argue systemic leakage [12] [8].
7. What the sources do not say — key data gaps
Available sources do not provide a single, authoritative global estimate of illicit trade specifically for body armour and military non‑lethal equipment; nor do they supply comprehensive trafficking routes with quantified volumes. They report case studies, market size estimates for the legitimate industry, and competing political claims about leakage, but comprehensive cross‑border seizure statistics or consolidated black‑market valuations are not present in the material provided [1] [4] [3].
8. Bottom line for policymakers and buyers
The evidence shows illicit trade in body armour and related military equipment is real and multi‑faceted: counterfeit certification, smuggling, theft and resale have all been documented [1] [3]. Rapidly growing legal markets and operations in conflict zones heighten risk, while publicly available reporting and official prosecutions offer snapshots rather than a full accounting; stronger supply‑chain controls, export licensing enforcement and transparent tracking would address the documented problems [11] [1].