Islamic terrorists
Executive summary
Islamist terrorism remained a dominant and evolving global threat in 2024–2025, with the Islamic State and its affiliates responsible for some of the deadliest attacks and highest casualty totals — the Global Terrorism Index attributes 1,805 deaths to Islamic State activity in 2025 and lists IS operations in 22 countries [1]. High-profile incidents — including the New Orleans vehicle attack that killed 14 people on New Year’s Day 2025 — underscore the persistence of both transnational networks and homegrown inspiration [2] [3].
1. A dispersed but deadly movement: Islamic State’s global footprint
The Islamic State no longer controls significant territory in Iraq and Syria, yet it operates through a hybrid model of regional affiliates and central inspiration that keeps it lethal and adaptive; the ICCT reports IS remains resilient and able to recruit, direct, or inspire attacks even after losing its territorial caliphate [4]. The Global Terrorism Index documents IS activity across 22 countries in 2025 and attributes 1,805 deaths to the group that year, indicating a diffusion of lethal operations beyond the group's former heartlands [1].
2. Africa, Syria and DRC: where the deadliest activity concentrates
The GTI finds 71% of IS-attributed activity concentrated in Syria and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2025, signaling that battlefields and fragile states remain the primary theatres where the organisation causes mass casualties [1]. Reporting in the GTI and related analyses also highlight ebbs and flows across the Sahel, Mozambique and parts of Central Africa, where local conflicts create openings for IS and rival groups to expand [5] [6].
3. Lone actors and homegrown inspiration: the Western risk
Western countries have seen a rise in deadly lone-actor incidents attributed to Islamist inspiration, with authorities linking the New Orleans truck attack on January 1, 2025 to an individual inspired by ISIS — that single attack killed 14 people and altered assessments of jihadist lethality in the U.S. [2] [7]. Analysts warn that the Islamic State’s “Virtual Caliphate,” social-media outreach and IS-Khorasan’s online savvy have amplified the risk of lone actors abroad even when on-the-ground control has waned [7] [6].
4. Affiliates matter: IS-Khorasan and regional cells drive complexity
UN and expert assessments singled out IS-Khorasan (IS-K) as a particularly capable and transnational affiliate by early 2025, responsible for high-profile, complex attacks and a disproportionate share of plots affecting Europe and elsewhere [4]. This affiliate model creates a dual threat: autonomous regional violence plus centrally inspired or directed plots that can cross borders and exploit diasporas and digital networks [4] [6].
5. Tallying incidents and the data challenge
Open-source compilations such as the GTI and event lists attempt to quantify terrorism but rely on differing definitions and databases; Wikipedia’s incident lists and specialist trackers show many events but reflect consensus-based selection criteria rather than a single authoritative count [8] [9]. The GTI states methodology and uses TerrorismTracker records to attribute deaths and incidents, which helps explain the detailed country-by-country figures reported in 2025 [5].
6. Counterterrorism successes and remaining vulnerabilities
Security services continue to disrupt plots and capture leaders — for example, arrests and successful operations in Lebanon, Syria and Mali were reported in 2025 — yet experts stress these successes coexist with the group’s capacity to adapt online and exploit governance vacuums [10] [5] [4]. Analysts at CSIS and other institutions caution that despite headline attacks, long-term trends in the U.S. show fewer jihadist plots and lower average lethality than during ISIS’s territorial peak, though single events can rapidly change public perception [2].
7. Competing threats and political fallout
Reporting underscores that Islamist terrorism is only one part of a broader security landscape: far-right and other extremist violence have surged in some contexts, and terrorist attacks often fuel polarization, Islamophobia and retaliatory dynamics that reshape threat environments and policy responses [11] [6]. Experts warn political agendas can skew threat prioritisation; some actors emphasise Islamist risks to justify hardline measures, while others stress the comparative rise of non-Islamist violent extremism [11] [6].
8. What the sources don’t say and limits of current reporting
Available sources document many 2024–2025 incidents and trends but do not provide a single settled global casualty count beyond the GTI’s figures; they also do not offer full public transparency on classified counterterrorism operations or all intelligence assessments. For questions about specific unreported attacks, networks, financing channels or classified assessments, available sources do not mention those details [1] [4] [5].
Conclusion — The empirical record from GTI, think tanks and incident catalogues shows Islamist terrorism in 2024–2025 remained adaptive and deadly in multiple theatres while trending lower in some Western contexts; policymakers face the dual challenge of suppressing violent networks on the ground and countering online radicalisation that inspires lone operators [1] [2] [7].