Did mossad carry out operations in australia recently

1. What the claim actually says — Mossad’s narrative and scope of activity that matters

Mossad’s public announcements state that Israeli intelligence identified an IRGC-linked network led by Sardar Amar that orchestrated or directed antisemitic attacks in multiple countries, including Australia, and that Mossad’s work helped foil those plots and dismantle cells between 2024 and 2025. These statements frame Mossad as both an investigator and an operational actor in an international counterterrorism effort, claiming it provided intelligence that contributed to arrests and the prevention of attacks and that dozens of attack tracks were disrupted with partners ^{[1] [4]}. The Mossad account links specific incidents — notably 2024 arson attacks in Melbourne and Sydney — into a broader pattern of Iranian-directed activity against Jewish targets abroad ^[3].

2. How Australian authorities responded — expulsions, investigations and mixed conclusions

The Australian federal government reacted by expelling Iran’s ambassador and moving toward listing the IRGC as a terrorist organization, reflecting national-level acceptance of a serious external threat and willingness to act on intelligence received ^[3]. However, state law enforcement and official responses are more nuanced: ASIO reportedly received Mossad intelligence and led much of the domestic investigative work, yet New South Wales police briefings and ministerial answers indicate several high-end incidents were committed by local organized crime figures rather than Iranian agents, leaving a gap between federal diplomatic moves and some on-the-ground investigative conclusions ^{[3] [2]}.

3. Where sources align — Iran’s involvement alleged and diplomatic fallout real

Across Israeli and international reporting there is alignment that Mossad identified an IRGC-linked figure and alleged a campaign targeting Jewish communities in multiple countries, and that this intelligence influenced policy decisions in Australia, including diplomatic expulsions and possible legal designations of the IRGC ^{[1] [3]}. Multiple reports assert that Mossad supplied information to Australian services and that cooperation helped prevent attacks. The diplomatic consequences — expulsions and formal condemnations — are factual and publicly recorded, showing real-world effects of the intelligence claims irrespective of unresolved forensic links for every incident ^{[1] [3]}.

4. Where sources diverge — evidentiary contradictions and police-level findings

A clear-and-present divergence exists over whether specific Australian incidents were Iranian-directed. NSW police and ministers report that most of the high-end offending incidents examined were attributed to local criminal actors, and that investigators found no direct Iranian interference in multiple cases, directly contesting Mossad’s sweeping implication of Iranian control over those acts ^[2]. That divergence raises important evidentiary questions: Mossad’s announcement rests on classified intelligence and its public naming of Amar does not equate to court-admissible forensic proof in each case, while Australian law enforcement emphasizes evidentiary rigor and attribution standards on domestic prosecutions ^{[2] [4]}.

5. Motives, transparency and the politics of intelligence-sharing

Intelligence agencies operate with strategic motives and diplomats respond politically; Israel’s declaration naming an IRGC commander and framing a global network could aim to pin international attention on Iran’s external operations and justify allied countermeasures. Conversely, Australian political authorities faced pressure to act after community-targeted incidents and may have used Mossad-sourced intelligence to prompt decisive diplomatic steps. Critics point to potential agenda-driven interpretation of incomplete or classified intelligence, while supporters argue that secrecy is necessary to protect sources and prevent further attacks — both stances explain why public narratives differ from investigative summaries released by police ^{[5] [2]}.

6. Bottom line — what is established, what remains unresolved, and next steps

What is established: Mossad publicly claims it identified an IRGC operative, Sardar Amar, linked to plots affecting Australia and shared intelligence that influenced Australian federal actions, including expulsions and counterterror planning ^{[1] [3]}. What remains unresolved: law-enforcement-level attribution for several Australian incidents remains contested, with state police findings attributing many attacks to local organized crime rather than direct Iranian agents ^[2]. The prudent next steps are transparent sharing of non-classified investigative findings between agencies, judicial or parliamentary review where appropriate, and careful public communication to reconcile intelligence claims with forensic evidence so policy responses rest on verifiable facts ^{[3] [2]}.