What has the Nigerian government and military response been to sectarian killings in Nigeria in 2023 and 2024?
Executive summary
The Nigerian government under President Bola Tinubu has publicly condemned sectarian and communal mass killings and ordered security operations and relief, while the military has carried out widespread air and ground operations—sometimes admitting mistakes and at other times denying civilian casualties—prompting international criticism and calls for independent inquiries [1] [2] [3]. Human-rights organisations and some NGOs document mass civilian deaths linked both to armed groups (Fulani herders, “bandits,” Boko Haram/ISWAP) and to military strikes—including a December 2023 airstrike that reportedly killed dozens and led to contested official explanations and calls for courts-martial [2] [3] [4].
1. Government condemnations and orders: public rhetoric, urgent promises
After high-casualty incidents—most notably mass attacks in Plateau and neighboring states in late 2023—the presidency publicly condemned the killings and ordered security agencies to “scour every stretch of the zone and apprehend the culprits,” and to mobilise relief for survivors, reflecting a pattern of strong rhetorical responses from state leadership [1] [3]. International and domestic critics say those condemnations often do not translate into sustained protection on the ground [1] [2].
2. Military operations: airstrikes, clearance operations and contested accountability
The armed forces have escalated air and ground “clearance operations” against bandits and jihadist groups, and the Defence Headquarters has sometimes asserted that strikes targeted embedded militants [1] [5]. Amnesty and other watchdogs document lethal airstrikes that killed civilians—citing Tudun Biri/Tundun Biri and other incidents—and say the military offered contradictory explanations while investigations and calls for independent inquiry followed [2] [4].
3. Detentions, courts-martial and internal responses to criticism
In the aftermath of controversial strikes, the military has taken some internal steps: journalists and human-rights groups report that two officers faced court-martial for the December 2023 Tundun Biri airstrike that Amnesty and HRW linked to heavy civilian deaths [4]. Human-rights advocates demand independent, transparent investigations; the government’s occasional internal disciplinary steps have not satisfied all observers [2] [4].
4. Focus on “bandits,” herder–farmer clashes and jihadists: multiple threats across regions
Nigerian security policy frames threats as a mix of criminal “bandits,” communal farmer–herder disputes (often attributed to Fulani gunmen), and jihadist groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP; official responses therefore vary by theatre—from counterinsurgency in the Northeast to aggressive air campaigns and ground raids in the Northwest and Middle Belt [5] [6] [7]. Government designation of groups as terrorists has expanded military latitude, including air operations in the Northwest [6] [8].
5. Humanitarian fallout and displacement: relief orders versus scale of need
The presidency ordered mobilisation of relief resources after mass attacks, but international agencies and NGOs warn that millions remain displaced and humanitarian need far outstrips response capacity; the IOM and UN data cited in multiple reports show sustained internal displacement linked to both insurgency and security operations [9] [5]. Amnesty and Human Rights Watch document a widening protection gap in rural communities [2] [4].
6. Diverging narratives: government denials, NGO tallies and politicised counts
Numbers and narratives diverge sharply. NGOs and faith-based groups produce high fatality counts and label violence as sectarian or genocidal; some sources cite thousands killed in 2023–24 in different tallies [10] [11]. Official statements emphasise counterterrorism gains and deny targeted persecution of religious groups; U.S. and international actors have at times relied on NGO figures, prompting Nigerian officials to reject what they call misleading accounts [12] [3].
7. Repression and the risk of securitised politics
Beyond battlefield actions, authorities have increasingly used security laws against critics: arrests and prosecutions of journalists, social-media commentators and protesters are reported alongside warnings that troops would “intervene” to prevent unrest—an approach that human-rights monitors say risks conflating dissent with violence and fuelling grievances [4] [13].
8. What reporting does not establish clearly
Available sources do not provide a single, independently verified national death toll attributable specifically to “sectarian killings” for 2023–2024; counts vary by source and methodology, and some claims—such as specific large-scale attributions of state complicity or genocide—are advanced by advocacy groups but disputed by others [10] [2]. Independent, nationwide judicial inquiries or reconciled tallies are not documented in the cited reporting [2] [4].
Conclusion — The official response mixes forceful military campaigns, episodic public pledges of relief and limited internal discipline, while human-rights organisations document civilian harm, contested explanations for airstrikes, and weak long-term protection. Competing narratives—government claims of counterterrorism necessity versus NGOs’ calls for independent probes and accountability—dominate coverage [1] [2] [4].