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Who are the primary groups responsible for killing Christians in Nigeria since 2015?
Executive summary
Since 2015 reporting and analysts identify three main categories of perpetrators killing Christians in Nigeria: jihadist insurgents (Boko Haram and ISWAP) operating mainly in the Northeast; armed Fulani herdsmen or militants tied to herder–farmer conflicts across the Middle Belt and some southern areas; and a wider set of “bandits”/gunmen whose motives blend criminality, communal rivalry and sometimes religion [1] [2] [3]. Estimates of totals and whether victims were killed specifically for their faith vary widely between advocacy groups, media and conflict monitors [4] [5].
1. Jihadist insurgents: Boko Haram and ISWAP — the overtly religious killers
Boko Haram (including the Islamic State West Africa Province after the 2016 split) is repeatedly documented targeting Christian villages, churches and clergy in the Northeast and bordering areas; European Union, U.S. government and security analysts report church burnings, kidnappings and executions of Christians who refuse to convert [6] [1] [7]. Reporting shows sustained attacks on Christian towns (e.g., Chibok area, repeated raids) and displacement of Christian populations by these jihadists [2] [8] [9].
2. Fulani herdsmen and associated militias — a mix of resource conflict and religious framing
A large body of reporting and academic analysis describes Fulani herders — some organized into armed groups or militias — as central actors in Middle Belt violence where many victims are Christian farmers; local leaders and Christian groups often view these attacks as targeted and sometimes religiously motivated, while other analysts emphasise land, grazing routes and climate-driven scarcity as core drivers [10] [11] [3]. Coverage also notes the fragmentation of Fulani actors: not all Fulani are militants, and links between some Fulani attackers and Islamist radicalization or criminal networks have been reported [12] [13].
3. Bandits, kidnappers and “unidentified gunmen” — criminal violence with mixed motives
News outlets and parliamentary evidence point to “bandits” and unidentified gunmen who attack villages, kidnap for ransom and kill civilians; these actors operate across northwest and central Nigeria and often overlap with ethnic or communal disputes rather than clear ideological campaigns against Christians [14] [15]. Local accounts commonly describe the lines between banditry, herdsmen militias and jihadist groups blurring, making attribution of motive (religious vs. criminal/land dispute) difficult [16] [3].
4. Disagreement over numbers and motive — advocacy claims vs. independent monitors
Christian advocacy groups and NGOs (Intersociety, Open Doors, others) publish high death tolls attributed to anti‑Christian violence—sometimes tens of thousands since 2015—while independent monitors and mainstream outlets warn figures and classifications are contested; the BBC and ACLED note that some datasets are hard to verify and that many deaths arise from conflicts whose motives are mixed (land disputes, banditry, insurgency) rather than exclusively religious persecution [17] [4] [5]. Parliament submissions and security analysts nevertheless list Boko Haram/ISWAP, Fulani militants and unidentified gunmen as the primary perpetrators of violence affecting many Christian communities [15] [5].
5. Regional pattern and victim distribution — Northeast vs Middle Belt and South
Jihadists have concentrated campaigns in the Northeast (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa) with church attacks, mass kidnappings and executions documented there; Fulani‑linked violence predominates in the Middle Belt (Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa) where farmers—many Christian—are repeatedly attacked; recent reporting shows violence spreading into southern states and disputed zones, complicating the safety map for Christians nationwide [8] [18] [19].
6. How analysts explain motive: religion, resources, politics — all three at once
Scholars and agencies emphasise that motives vary by actor: Boko Haram/ISWAP pursue a jihadist agenda that explicitly targets those considered “infidels” (including Christians) [20] [6]; Fulani violence is often rooted in grazing/land competition and climate pressures though sometimes framed or radicalised along religious lines [10] [13]; banditry is commonly criminal and opportunistic but can produce mass casualties among Christian communities [16] [15].
7. Limitations and what sources don’t settle
Available sources disagree on total fatalities attributed specifically to “being Christian,” and some datasets and advocacy reports use different definitions—killed for faith versus killed in violence that disproportionately affects Christians—so a single definitive body count since 2015 is not consistent across reporting [4] [17]. Available sources do not mention a single unified command coordinating all attacks on Christians; instead they describe multiple, overlapping perpetrators [5] [12].
8. Bottom line for readers: multiple perpetrators, mixed motives, contested numbers
Reporting and expert bodies concur that Boko Haram/ISWAP, armed Fulani herdsmen/militias and bandits/unidentified gunmen are the primary groups killing Christians since 2015, but they disagree on whether every such death should be classified as religious persecution versus violence driven by land, criminality or local politics; readers should therefore treat high aggregate death figures with caution and note the contested methodologies behind them [1] [3] [4].