Fact check: What did the 2021 Census say about the number of Muslims in England and Wales in 2021?

1. Why the headline number is consistent and what it actually means

Multiple analyses converge on the same headline: about 3.87–3.9 million Muslims in England and Wales in 2021, comprising 6.5% of the population, with the 2011 baseline at about 2.7 million (4.9%), producing a ~44% increase in ten years ^{[1] [2] [4]}. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) publication and contemporary summaries from community organisations report essentially the same totals and percentages, indicating broad agreement across sources rather than a dispute about the raw count ^{[1] [5]}. That consistency reflects the census method of self-identification: respondents ticked a religion box, and the aggregate is the sum of those responses. The number therefore measures self-reported religious identity at one point in time, not practice, belief intensity, or lineage, and is subject to the usual census limitations such as non-response and classification choices.

2. Who grew and where — unpacking the drivers behind the increase

Analyses attribute the increase partly to natural growth from a younger age profile and partly to migration, including arrivals from conflict-affected countries, with community briefs and ONS age breakdowns noting Muslims had the youngest average age (around 27 years) and a high share under 50 (84.5%), which boosts births and cohort momentum ^{[5] [6]}. The census also shows concentrations in major urban centres — London, Birmingham, Manchester and specific London boroughs — where percentages are notably higher, reinforcing how local geography amplifies visibility and services demand ^{[7] [4]}. These drivers are not mutually exclusive and the data do not attribute precise shares to fertility versus migration, so interpreting the relative contribution requires complementary migration, birth, and administrative data beyond the census itself.

3. Demographic detail that matters for interpretation

Beyond the headline, the census provides sex and age breakdowns that change the policy picture: the count shows slightly more males than females identifying as Muslim (about 1.96 million males to 1.91 million females in England and Wales), and a median/mean age far below the general population, which has implications for schooling, labour market entry, and service planning ^{[3] [6]}. The younger profile means the Muslim population contributes disproportionately to child and working-age cohorts, while the general population is older on average. These internal compositions matter far more for local public services and electoral dynamics than the headline percentage, but they are often omitted in high-level reporting where the 6.5% figure becomes the dominant soundbite.

4. Points of agreement and where nuance gets lost in headlines

All sources agree on the aggregate totals and the percentage share; the differences in reporting come down to rounding and phrasing (e.g., 3.87 million vs 3.9 million) and on emphasis — some community analyses highlight the 44% increase and youthfulness as opportunities and pressures, while official releases stress methodological caveats and demographic context ^{[1] [5] [2]}. Important nuances often elided in media accounts include that the census counts self-identified religion at one time point, that it does not measure religiosity or practice, and that local concentrations produce very different local percentages than the national average. These omitted considerations change how one should read the number for policy, funding, and public debate.

5. Bottom line for journalists, policymakers and the public

The verified bottom line is clear and robust: about 3.9 million Muslims in England and Wales in 2021, equal to 6.5% of the population, up roughly 44% since 2011 — a fact repeated across official ONS publications and independent analyses ^{[1] [2]}. For decision-makers, the headline should be paired with the census’s age, sex and geographic breakdowns to shape education, health, housing and integration policies. For consumers of news, the key caveats are that the number is self-reported identity, not a measure of belief or practice, and that local patterns can differ sharply from the national average, all of which matters when translating the census count into real-world implications ^{[6] [7]}.