Majority of kurdish people are not religious

1. The baseline: most Kurds are reported as Muslim

Multiple summaries and surveys describe Sunni Islam as the dominant faith among Kurds, with Sunni adherents forming the majority in Kurdistan generally and approaching near-universality in some Iraqi Kurdish governorates; broad overviews such as BBC and regional sources report “the majority are Sunni Muslims,” and encyclopedic profiles estimate roughly 75% Sunni with other Muslims and minor religions filling most of the remainder ^{[6] [2] [3]}. A 2011 Pew snapshot cited by Kurdish Project finds nearly all Kurds in Iraq identifying as Sunni (98% in that sample), showing the depth of Islamic identification in at least that national context ^[1].

2. Religious minorities and the picture of diversity

Kurdish society is religiously heterogeneous: Yazidis, Yarsan (Ahl-e Haqq), Alevis, Zoroastrians, Christians and historically Jews have significant presences in different regions, and these groups meaningfully shape local religious landscapes — for example, Yazidis are concentrated around Sinjar and other areas and have endured targeted violence that reshaped demographics ^{[7] [8] [3]}. Encyclopedic and regional government summaries underscore that while Sunni Islam predominates, non-Muslim Kurdish communities remain visible and institutionally recognized in places like the Kurdistan Region of Iraq ^{[5] [9]}.

3. Where “not religious” claims come from: secularism, nationalism and urban shifts

Some sources and commentators describe Kurdish communities as comparatively tolerant and at times more secular in social norms than neighboring populations; activist-leaning or diaspora sites note growing numbers of atheists, agnostics and non-affiliated people, and Kurdish women’s relative freedoms are sometimes cited as evidence of more secular social attitudes in parts of Kurdistan ^{[10] [9]}. Academic and political histories also note a strand of Kurdish nationalism that has emphasized ethnic identity over religiosity, and some groups valorize pre-Islamic traditions as cultural touchstones ^[11]. These phenomena can produce impressions that Kurds are broadly secular, but the empirical bases in the reporting are uneven and often localized.

4. Youth and regional nuance: not a uniform decline of religiosity

Empirical work cited about Iraqi Kurdistan finds a mixed youth profile rather than a clear majority of non-religious young Kurds: one sociological study estimated roughly half of youth as “religious,” with the remainder varying in degrees of observance and belief, and events like COVID-19 and reactions to ISIS produced both increases and decreases in religiosity among different subgroups ^[5]. That indicates important generational and contextual complexity: religiosity among Kurds is not monolithic, but neither does the evidence show a majority turning away from religion across the board ^{[5] [4]}.

5. Bottom line, limits of the record and alternative interpretations

On balance, the reporting supports the conclusion that most Kurds remain religiously Muslim, with significant minorities and localized secular or non-religious trends; the blanket statement “majority of Kurdish people are not religious” is contradicted by multiple general sources ^{[2] [1] [6]}. Caveats: available sources emphasize national/regional samples (especially Iraqi Kurds), and claims about rising secularism rely more on qualitative commentary or localized reporting than on broad, up-to-date survey data covering Kurds across Turkey, Iran, Syria and the diaspora ^{[10] [11]}. The strongest alternative view — that Kurdish identity has a strong secular-nationalist strain and growing non-affiliation — exists in the literature but does not, in current reporting, override the demographic reality of majority Muslim identification ^{[11] [10]}.